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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a war raging over autism.1  On one side are the parents of
autistic children who desperately want a cure for their children’s condition. 
On the other is the “neurodiversity movement”—autistic adults
who proclaim that they do not want to be cured because there is nothing 
wrong with them.2  Although this war has been going on for some time, 
proposed changes to the fourth edition of the American Psychiatric
Association’s (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-IV) have reinvigorated the debate.  Under the proposed
fifth edition (DSM-V), there are no longer subtypes of autism—no 
“Asperger’s syndrome,” no “pervasive developmental disorder not 
otherwise specified (PDD NOS).”3  You are autistic, or you are not.
The autism debate is ground zero in a much larger and older debate over
the meaning of disability.  The word disability inhabits a world of binaries.
It calls to mind a seemingly endless array of opposites that touch on
1. MICHAEL FITZPATRICK, DEFEATING AUTISM: A DAMAGING DELUSION 8 (2009). 
2. For simplicity’s sake, this Article speaks of two sides in the autism debate. 
One might reasonably argue that there are more.  See Ian Hacking, Humans, Aliens &
Autism, 138 DAEDALUS 44, 44–45 (2009) (“Autism is a highly contested field, and there 
are many collectives with quite distinct agendas.”); see also Andrew Solomon, The 
Autism Rights Movement, N.Y. MAG., June 2, 2008, http://nymag.com/news/features/ 
47225/ (“There are in reality three sides in this debate: those who believe autism is
caused by environmental toxins (especially vaccines) and should be cured by addressing 
those pollutants; those who believe it is genetic and should be addressed through the 
genome; and the neurodiverse, who believe that it is genetic and should be left alone. 
These camps are blatantly hostile to one another.”).
3. See Autism Spectrum Disorder: Proposed Revision, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N 
DSM-5 DEV., http://www.dsm5.org/ProposedRevision/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=94 
(last revised Jan. 26, 2011) [hereinafter DSM-V Proposed Revision]; AM. PSYCHIATRIC 
ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-IV 75–78 
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nearly every aspect of our lives—one side good or desirable, and the 
other side bad or undesirable.  How capable we are: “ability vs. inability.”
How limited we are: “mild vs. severe.”  How we fit into the world: “normal 
vs. abnormal.”  How much we contribute: “asset vs. burden.” How
free we are: “independence vs. dependence.”  How fit we are: “strong vs.
weak.”  How attractive we are: “beautiful vs. ugly.” How happy we are:
“joy vs. suffering.”  How fortunate we are: “blessing vs. curse.”  And, of 
course, how healthy we are: “health vs. sickness.”  What all of these
binaries have in common is that they are predicated on a view of disability 
as a personal deficit in bodily functioning, and personal deficits are 
always “bad.” 
Beginning in the 1970s, British scholars pioneered the “social model” 
of disability, which presented a new way of looking at disability.4 
Specifically, they challenged the status quo, what they called the “medical
model” of disability, which viewed disability as a personal deficit in 
bodily functioning.5  They advanced the idea of disability as a social 
construction, one that is synonymous with oppression or disadvantage 
imposed by society.6  Although the social model of disability did wonders 
to illuminate disability’s troubling binaries, it did little to resolve them. 
In fact, it created new ones.  “Love vs. hate.”  “Acceptance vs. fear.”
“Difference vs. defect.” “Gift vs. flaw.” “Equality vs. oppression.”  “Culture
vs. cure.”  “Identity vs. impairment.”  “Pride vs. shame.”  And above all: 
“social model vs. medical model.”  Binaries remain.7 
Rarely are things black or white; there is often much gray.  When it 
comes to disability, this is especially so.  A model for understanding 
disability ought to help us understand that gray, but in many ways, the 
4. See, e.g., SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE 
DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 18 (2009); Rosemary Kayess & Phillip French, Out of 
Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2008). 
5. BAGENSTOS, supra note 4, at 18. 
6. Id. 
7. See, e.g., MICHAEL OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY: FROM THEORY TO 
PRACTICE 45 tbl.3.1 (2d ed. 2009) (distinguishing “individual,” or medical, from “social” 
model of disability); Tom Shakespeare, The Social Model of Disability, in  THE 
DISABILITY STUDIES READER 266, 270 (Lennard J. Davis ed., 3d ed. 2010) (“Rather than 
simply opposing medicalization, [the social model] can be interpreted as rejecting
medical prevention, rehabilitation or cure of impairment . . . .”); Tom Shakespeare &
Nicholas Watson, The Social Model of Disability: An Outdated Ideology?, in
2 RESEARCH IN SOCIAL SCIENCE AND DISABILITY 9, 11 (Sharon N. Barnartt & Barbara M. 
Altman eds., 2001) (“The social model could be used to view the world in black and 
















    
 







   





tension between the social and medical models obscures.  And the autism
debate demonstrates why.
At a superficial level, the competing aims of parents and autistic
adults—the “autism rights” or neurodiversity movement—fit neatly into 
the medical-versus-social model binary.  The former see autism as
a disorder to be treated and possibly cured (medical model), and the 
neurodiverse see it as an experience worthy of celebration or at least
respect (social model).
But delving deeper, there is a good deal of overlap between autism’s 
factions and, importantly, between the medical and social models
themselves.  Both models regard disability as something that ought to be 
gotten rid of, whether that disability is a negative medical state within 
the person or negative treatment imposed by society; neither model
demands a particular policy response; and both models acknowledge the 
inevitability of impairment.8  Given their similarities, the stark dividing 
line between the social and medical models is not as clear as it seems.
At bottom, the two models describe dueling theories about what causes 
disability, and little else.9 
The medical-versus-social model binary is therefore a poor way of 
distinguishing between autism’s factions.  Far from distinguishing the 
two sides in the autism debate, the medical-versus-social model binary
suggests that both parents and the neurodiverse seek the same thing: an 
end to disability, albeit through very different means.  Furthermore,
although the two sides clash over the pursuit of cures and certain 
treatments for autism, those policy choices are dependent on moral
frameworks—not disability’s dueling models of causation.  And lastly, 
although both models of disability agree that impairment is inevitable, 
this turns out to be precisely what parents and the neurodiverse do not
agree about. 
The real fight within the autism community has to do with autism’s 
essence, but the hard-and-fast distinction between impairment’s10 biological 
8. See infra Part IV.C. 
9. See infra Part IV.B. 
10. The word impairment is not without ambiguity, and I will explore some of that
ambiguity in Part V of this Article.  Here I use the word consistent with disability theory
and disability rights law to describe that subset of physical and mental traits,
characteristics, differences, and variations that concern the medical profession—those 
that are named and diagnosed, such as cancer or depression.  The medical profession
tends to use the word disorder—or dysfunction, deficit, defect, condition—to describe 
this subset of traits and uses the word impairment as a synonym for “limitation” of life
functioning. Compare  MICHAEL OLIVER, THE POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT: A SOCIOLOGICAL 
APPROACH 11 (1990) (using the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation’s
definition of impairment as “lacking part of or all of a limb, or having a defective limb,
organism or mechanism of the body”), and Regulations To Implement the Equal 
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core and people’s experience of impairment is illusory.11  Given the recent 
amendments to the definition of disability under the ADA, which defines 
disability as an “impairment that substantially limits one or more major 
life activities,” the meaning of impairment is now more salient than ever.12 
A recent second wave of disabilities studies suggests that impairment, 
like disability, is constructed by the social practices and institutions that
name and diagnose it.13  This is true so far as it goes, but the autism
debate suggests another way that impairment is constructed: it is
constructed not only by those who name it but also by those who are 
(2011) (“Physical or mental impairment means—(1) Any physiological disorder or
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems . . . 
or (2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as an intellectual disability (formerly
termed “mental retardation”), organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and
specific learning disabilities.”), with THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY (19th 
ed. 2011) (describing etiology, diagnosis, and treatment of various physical and mental 
“disorders”), and DSM-IV, supra note 3, at xxi–ii (defining mental disorder as a “clinically
significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual,” 
which may be associated with, among other things, “impairment in one or more important
areas of functioning” and that “must currently be considered a manifestation of a behavioral, 
psychological, or biological dysfunction in the individual”).  By impairment, I do not mean
physical or mental traits that are not diagnosed, such as eye or hair color or personality type.
See Asperger’s Disorder: Rationale, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N DSM-5 DEV., http://www.
dsm5.org/ProposedRevisions/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=97# (last visited Jan. 13, 
2012) (distinguishing personality type from disorder); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (2011)
(excluding from definition of impairment: “physical characteristics such as eye color,
hair color, left-handedness, or height, weight, or muscle tone that are within ‘normal’ 
range and are not the result of a physiological disorder”; “common personality traits such
as poor judgment or a quick temper where these are not symptoms of a mental or 
psychological disorder”; “[e]nvironmental, cultural, or economic disadvantages such as 
poverty, lack of education, or a prison record are not impairments”; and “[a]dvanced age, 
in and of itself”).  Nor do I mean only that subset of physical and mental traits that limit 
life functioning. A mole, for instance, is a cluster of skin cells that do not grow
normally.  It may be benign and not limit functioning in any way.  It may also develop 
into cancer that can kill.  Either way, it is a physical impairment.  Similarly, although 
many mental impairments limit life functioning, not all do.  Some impairments put one at 
risk of death or pain, for instance, but fall short of limiting life functioning.  See DSM-
IV, supra note 3, at xxi. 
11. See infra Part V.C. 
12. See generally Kevin Barry, Toward Universalism: What the ADA Amendments 
Act of 2008 Can and Can’t Do for Disability Rights, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
203, 208 (2010) (discussing the ADA Amendments Act’s protection of “nearly everyone
from discrimination based on impairments” under the third prong and the relaxation of
the “substantial limitation” requirement under the first and second prongs).  Although the
social constructions of disability and impairment have implications for disability rights
law, generally, and the ADA, in particular, they are beyond the scope of this Article. 




   
   
 









    
  
    
 
     
     
  
 
    










     
 
   
named—autistic people, themselves.14 The neurodiversity movement, 
which claims autism as a way of being, is neither quaint nor quackery.  It 
underscores that part of autism is the experience of those who are 
classified as having autism and who are changed by being so classified.15 
For them, autism is a part of their being, not—or not only—some as of
yet unknown biological pathology.16  Moreover, by adapting to, resisting, 
and transforming the social practices and institutions that classify them,
autistic people change autism.17  Autism, like other impairments, is
therefore not fixed; its meaning is evolving as the group denoted by the
diagnosis changes. 
Although many legal scholars have articulated the distinction between
the social and medical models of disability and between impairment and
disability, few have scrutinized the assumptions upon which these 
binaries are based.18  That is the purpose of this Article.  Using autism as 
a case study, this Article attempts to show that the oft-claimed binary
between the social model of disability (which holds that disability is 
socially constructed) and the medical model of disability (which holds 
that it is not) is not as stark as it is often made out to be, and that
impairment is not solely biological but instead socially constructed, in
part, by those who are diagnosed.  Although these conclusions do not
14. See infra Part V.C. 
15. See infra Part V.C. 
16. See infra Part V.C.  By  biological pathology, I mean those “‘objectively’
ascertainable abnormalities of anatomy, physiology, or biochemistry” underlying various 
impairments.  See Carol A. Bernstein, Meta-Structure in DSM-5 Process, PSYCHIATRIC 
NEWS, Mar. 4, 2011, at 7, available at http://psychnews.psychiatryonline.org/newsarticle.
aspx?article id=108259. Biological pathologies contrast with the DSM’s psychopathologies,
the diagnosis of which is based “entirely on clinical description.” See id. (“[E]ven today
objective tests and biomarkers for mental disorders remain research goals rather than
clinical tools.”); see also HERB KUTCHINS & STUART A. KIRK, MAKING US CRAZY: DSM: 
THE PSYCHIATRIC BIBLE AND THE CREATION OF MENTAL DISORDERS 27 (1997) (“Defining 
a mental disorder involves specifying the features of human experiences that demarcate
where normality shades into abnormality. . . .  Determining when relatively common 
experiences such as anxiety or sadness or memory lapses should be considered evidence
of some disorder requires the setting of boundaries that are largely arbitrary, not scientific,
unlike setting the boundaries for what constitutes cancer or pneumonia.”).  The boundary
between biological and psychopathologies is, of course, blurred: many clinicians believe
that psychopathologies are biologically rooted.  See id. at 30 (“[M]ental disorders are a 
subset of medical disorders.” (quoting Robert L. Spitzer & Jean Endicott, Medical and
Mental Disorder: Proposed Definition and Criteria, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN PSYCHIATRIC 
DIAGNOSIS 15, 35 (Robert L. Spitzer & Jean Endicott eds., 1978)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).
17. See infra Part V.C. 
18. See Bradley A. Areheart, Disability Trouble, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 347, 
353–54 (2011) (stating that “[l]egal scholars have certainly written about the social
model . . . but few have been critical of the social model” (footnote omitted)).  For two 
thoughtful articles scrutinizing these assumptions, see id. and Adam Samaha, What Good 
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make peace between autism’s dueling sides, they help to explain how the 
sides disagree “and why, perhaps, the twain shall never meet.”19 
In Part II of this Article, I provide a brief overview of autism.  In Part 
III, I describe in some detail the dueling conceptions of autism advanced
by the parents of autistic children and autism’s neurodiversity movement, 
including their disagreement over cures and treatment for autism.  In
Part IV, using philosopher Ian Hacking’s account of social construction
as a guide, I cover some familiar territory: disability’s medical and social
models.  According to the medical model, disability is the inevitable result
of functionally limiting impairments, while under the social model, 
disability is socially constructed by practices and institutions that
disadvantage people on the basis of impairment. After examining 
similarities and differences between the two models, I explain why the
social-versus-medical model binary does not explain the autism debate. 
Part V suggests that the real battle between the neurodiverse and 
parents is not about disability at all—it is about impairment, about the 
meaning of autism.  Returning to Ian Hacking’s version of social
construction, I argue that impairment is both an “idea” (which is socially 
constructed) and an “object” (which may or may not be).  Impairments 
are socially constructed ideas because they are contingent upon the
social practices and institutions that name and diagnose them, and that 
legislate, educate, entertain, and employ people with them.  The idea of
autism never had to be: autism could have remained childhood
schizophrenia or mental retardation (MR), or could never have been 
named at all; and schools, summer camps, laws, and other practices
impacting autistic children need never have been put in place. 
Beyond the idea of impairment, I argue that impairment refers to two
very different kinds of objects: pathologies and people.  Although
pathologies are indifferent to social practices and institutions, people are 
not.  Autistic people change in response to those practices and 
institutions—adapting to, resisting, and transforming them.  In this way,
the neurodiverse change, or construct, autism.  Autism may be both an
undiscovered pathology that is inevitable and, importantly, a different 
way of being that is constructed.  In Part VI, I offer some concluding 
remarks. 

























   
  
 
II. AUTISM 101 
There is much debate over what autism is, and this Article will touch 
on that debate.20  As a starting point, most agree that autism is a
neurodevelopmental condition, that is, a condition that impacts brain 
development and functioning.21  There is no blood test or other definitive
biological marker for autism.22  “You cannot see autism under a microscope
or discover it through a lab test.”23  Instead, diagnoses of autism are 
based on the recognition of certain core behavioral features, namely, social 
communication or interaction differences and fixated interests and
repetitive behaviors.24  For example, an autistic person may have difficulty 
interpreting social cues and facial expressions, expressing emotions in 
conventionally recognizable ways, and developing and maintaining age-
appropriate peer relationships.25  The autistic person may also demonstrate
20. See infra text accompanying notes 243–46.  The word autism comes from the 
Greek autos, meaning “self,” and was first used by Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler in
1912 “to describe the behavior of some people, then diagnosed with schizophrenia, who 
were disengaged from everything except their internal world.”  ROY RICHARD GRINKER, 
UNSTRANGE MINDS: REMAPPING THE WORLD OF AUTISM 44 (2007).  In his now-famous 
1943 article titled Autistic Disturbances of Affective Contact, American psychiatrist Leo 
Kanner described eleven children who had difficulty relating to other people, speech 
delays or unusual language, fantastic rote memories, and an obsession with sameness and 
repetition. Id. at 44, 46.  Kanner named these shared characteristics “infantile autism.”
Id. at 44.  At the same time, and unbeknownst to Kanner, Austrian psychiatrist Hans 
Asperger “was examining autistic children and used the word ‘autism’ to describe them.” 
Id. at 56.  In his 1944 article titled “Autistic Psychopathy” in Childhood, Asperger—
writing in German—described four children who, “despite being highly intelligent and 
highly verbal, . . . rarely made eye contact” and “exhibited unusual repetitive behaviors.” 
Id. at 58–59.  “Kanner’s name is associated with the classic, severe form of autism.
Asperger’s is associated with more mildly autistic, or at least highly intelligent and
highly verbal, children.”  Id. at 58.  Perhaps because he wrote in English, Kanner’s work
became better known more quickly than Asperger’s.  Id. at 60.  In 1968, the second
edition of the APA’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual listed “autistic, atypical and 
withdrawn behavior” in its description of “Schizophrenia, childhood type.” See Roy
Richard Grinker, Diagnostic Criteria for Autism Through the Years, UNSTRANGE MINDS 
(2007), http://www.unstrange.com/dsm1.html.  In 1980, with the publication of the 
DSM-III, autism came into its own as a distinct diagnosis called “infantile autism,” 
which was renamed “autistic disorder” in successive editions of the DSM.  See id.
Asperger’s disorder did not enter the lexicon of most mental health clinicians until the
publication of the DSM-IV in 1994, when the APA formally recognized the impairment. 
GRINKER, supra, at 60–61. 
21. SIMON BARON-COHEN, THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE: THE TRUTH ABOUT THE 
MALE AND FEMALE BRAIN 137 (2003). 
22. Daniela Caruso, Autism in the U.S.: Social Movement and Legal Change, 36 
AM. J.L. & MED. 483, 490 (2010). 
23. GRINKER, supra note 20, at 2. 
24. DSM-V Proposed Revision, supra note 3. 
25. Id.; see also Hacking, supra note 2, at 52 (“[Autistic people have] notorious 
difficulty with eye contact.  For whatever reason, autistic people, when they look at
someone’s face at all, tend to focus on the lower part of the face (the mouth and chin)
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unusual sensory behaviors such as hand- or finger-flapping, excessive
adherence to routines, and inflexibility and discomfort with change.26 
Most also agree that autism is highly variable: the intensity of autism’s 
core features varies significantly from person to person, and these 
features may change throughout an individual’s lifetime.27  As Dr. Ami 
Klin, Professor of Child Psychology and Psychiatry at the Yale Child
Study Center, has thoughtfully remarked: 
The variability is immense.  From individuals who are burdened by severe to
profound intellectual disabilities to persons who are gifted and more competent 
than most in the community.  From those who cannot speak to those who are 
loquacious.  From those whose isolation is manifest by complete social withdrawal 
to those who cannot stop approaching others albeit at times awkwardly.  From 
persons who are enchained by self-stimulating movements, rituals and self-
injurious behaviors to those whose knowledge about circumscribed areas
of knowledge or special skills are prodigious.  These, at times, extreme 
characteristics notwithstanding, all are people with emotions who can love and
can be hurt, who need to meet the demands of everyday life, and who are 
desirous of independence and meaningful relationships.  Some are in need of
intensive supports whereas others require little more than an equal opportunity
community.  All deserve a stab at happiness and a fulfilling life.  Most can
make contributions to society whereas some can in fact build on their specific
strengths and reach unique achievements in science, art and technology.28 
Given the breadth of autism’s variability, autism is generally thought
of as a continuum or “spectrum.”29  There is a saying in the world of autism:
26. DSM-V Proposed Revision, supra note 3.  There are many aspects of autism 
beyond social communication/interaction differences and fixated interests.  As Professor
Hacking notes, “Many autistic children are subject to seizures.  Many are hypersensitive 
to loud sounds, bright colors, and itchy surfaces.”  Hacking, supra note 2, at 48.  Limited 
motor skills, such as “bad balance, a tendency to bump into things, poor hand-eye
coordination, difficulties in initiating or stopping movements, and even a poor hand-
grasp,” are also typical among autistic children.  Id.  For a helpful discussion of autistic 
features beyond those listed in the DSM, see generally SCOTT STANDIFER, ADULT AUTISM 
AND EMPLOYMENT: A GUIDE FOR VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION PROFESSIONALS 1–12 (2009),
available at http://dps.missouri.edu/Autism/Adult%20Autism%20&%20Employment.pdf,
which discusses experiential and functional features of autism.
27. GRINKER, supra note 20, at 10. 
28. Ami Klin, Articles of Understanding: Introduction, GLOBAL & REGIONAL 
ASPERGER SYNDROME PARTNERSHIP (2006), http://www.grasp.org/new_art.htm. 
29. See DSM-V Proposed Revision, supra note 3 (proposing to rename “autistic 
disorder” to “autism spectrum disorder”); see also  GRINKER, supra note 20, at 10
(“‘Autism’ today is really an autism spectrum.”).  While spectrum rightly connotes 
autism’s diversity, it also oversimplifies.  As Professor Hacking notes, 
[S]pectra are linear and autism isn’t.  The metaphor suggests that you can 
arrange autistic people on a line, from more to less.  It does make sense to 
speak of high-functioning people with autism, but that covers an extraordinary






















     
 
   
 






“When you know a person on the [autism] spectrum, you know one person
on the spectrum.”30  Because the autism spectrum “is broad enough to 
encompass both a severely mentally retarded autistic person without speech 
and a super-intelligent but socially awkward mathematician or physicist,”31 
one might say that the world of autism is the world.  Or nearly so.  As a
result, autism resists easy definition. 
Although the DSM-IV tries to distinguish various points along the 
autism spectrum by providing diagnostic categories for various subtypes
of autism, such as Asperger’s32 and PDD-NOS,33 the DSM-V is poised to
dispatch with that effort.  According to the DSM-V’s Neurodevelopmental
Disorders Working Group, “A single spectrum disorder is a better reflection 
of the state of knowledge about pathology and clinical presentation.”34 
Multiple diagnostic categories, the Group concedes, “were equivalent to 
trying to ‘cleave meatloaf at the joints’” and were found to be “inconsistent 
over time, variable across sites and often associated with severity, language 
level or intelligence rather than features of the disorder.”35 
Lastly, most agree that there are lots of people who have, and have
had, autism.  According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), an average
of 1 in 110 U.S. children have autism, or about 1% of all U.S. children.36 
which, if anything, covers an even wider range of individuals. . . .  I would 
prefer to speak of an autistic manifold.
See Hacking, supra note 2, at 47. 
30. Solomon, supra note 2. 
31. GRINKER, supra note 20, at 10. 
32. DSM-IV, supra note 3, at 75–77.  According to the DSM-IV, people with 
Asperger’s and people with “classic” autism share limitations in social interaction and 
restricted interests and behaviors. Id. at 66, 75–77.  The difference between the two is 
that people with Asperger’s have no clinically significant delay in speech or cognitive 
development—good IQ—whereas some people with autism do.  Id.
33. Id. at 77–78.  According to the DSM-IV, PDD-NOS is a catch-all condition 
encompassing those with either limitations in social interaction/communication or
restricted interests, behaviors, and activities. Id.  It includes “atypical autism,” presentations
that do not meet the criteria for Asperger’s or classic autism, id. at 78, and is the most 
common diagnosis of those with autism.  See GRINKER, supra note 20, at 140. According to
Professor Grinker, PDD-NOS and Asperger’s disorder make up as much as 75% of all 
new cases of autism, and “Asperger cases account for between 14 and 19 percent of the 
total autism spectrum population.”  Id. at 159, 163. 




36. What We’ve Learned About Autism Spectrum Disorder, CTR. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/Features/CountingAutism/ (last updated 
Apr. 4, 2011).  Many people, including those in print, radio, and television media, have 
gone so far as to call autism an “epidemic.”  See, e.g., GRINKER, supra note 20, at 143. 
Although extended discussion of autism’s prevalence is beyond the scope of this Article, 
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Beyond this, there is little agreement about the meaning of autism.  As 
epitomized by the words of Jim Sinclair, an autistic adult, many autistic 
people regard autism as an experience, as a different way of being worthy
of respect.37 Others, such as Kit Weintraub, the mother of two autistic
children, believe that autism is a disorder to be cured or treated.38 
Although disability’s dueling medical and social models would appear to
explain the autism debate, they fall short.  The autism debate is not about 
the social construction of disability; it is about the social construction of 
impairment.  Given autism’s newness to the legal literature, I describe 
this debate in some detail in the Part that follows.39 
III. AUTISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
Autism is a way of being.  It is not possible to separate the
person from the autism.
Therefore, when parents say, “I wish my child did not have
autism,” what they’re really saying is, “I wish the autistic child I 
have did not exist, and I had a different (non-autistic) child 
instead.”
Read that again.  This is what we hear when you mourn over
our existence.  This is what we hear when you pray for a cure. 
This is what we know, when you tell us of your fondest hopes and 
dreams for us: that your greatest wish is that one day we will
cease to be, and strangers you can love will move in behind our 
faces.
. . . .
You didn’t lose a child to autism.  You lost a child because the 
child you waited for never came into existence.  That isn’t the
fault of the autistic child who does exist, and it shouldn’t be our 
burden.  We need and deserve families who can see us and value
science—more reliable [and broader] definitions of autism and more awareness among 
health-care professionals and educators.”  Id. at 145–46.  “The bottom line is that 
reported autism prevalence has increased, but the real prevalence has probably remained 
stable.” Id. at 169; see also  FITZPATRICK, supra note 1, at 28 (noting that Grinker’s 
conclusions “echo[] the consensus of authorities in the field of autism”). 
37. See infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
38. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
39. For an excellent discussion of autism’s intersections with law and policy, see 
















   
 












us for ourselves, not families whose vision of us is obscured by the
ghosts of children who never lived.  Grieve if you must, for your
own lost dreams.  But don’t mourn for us.  We are alive.  We are 
real.  And we’re here waiting for you.
   —Jim Sinclair, Don’t Mourn for Us40 
I love my children, but I do not love autism.  My children are
not part of a select group of superior beings named “autistics.”
They have autism, a neurological impairment devastating in its
implications for their lives, if left untreated.  I do not know the
cause of autism, but research tells me the most likely possibility is 
that there is some kind of genetic anomaly, perhaps influenced by
environmental factors.  In other words, it is no more normal to be 
autistic than it is to have spina bifida.  As with any other condition
that would threaten their future and their happiness, I do as much 
as I can to help them be as functional and as normal as possible.
And no, “normal” to me does not mean “a cookie-cutter robot-
child, trained to do my will.”  It means: “able, like most people 
without autism, to lead an independent, purpose-filled life.”  Able
to speak, able to communicate, able to form and keep relationships. 
I have spent most of the last eight years poring over research on the
treatment of autism.  I have attended lectures and spent hours
preparing materials for my children’s ABA therapy programs.
I do all of this because I love my children and because this
treatment has helped them develop language, cognitive, self-help
and social skills, all things that they would not have acquired
without this treatment.
  —Kit Weintraub, A Mother’s Perspective41 
A.  Defeating Autism 
For many families, particularly those whose autistic children have
profound functional limitations, the challenges of autism can be
overwhelming.  For them, “the search for cures, or at least, for more
effective treatments, is a clear consensus.”42  Many choose the path of 
conventional medicine, while others pursue an alternative course.43 
40. Jim Sinclair, Don’t Mourn for Us, AUTISM NETWORK INT’L, http://www. 
autreat.com/dont_mourn.html (last modified June 26, 2002). 
41. Kit Weintraub, A Mother’s Perspective, ASS’N FOR SCI. AUTISM TREATMENT, 
http://www.asatonline.org/forum/archives/mother.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2012). 
42. Klin, supra note 28. 
43. See MAJIA HOLMER NADESAN, CONSTRUCTING AUTISM: UNRAVELLING THE 
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1. “Autism as Puzzle”: Mainstream Medicine and Autism Research 
For parents who subscribe to conventional medicine, autism is a puzzle, 
its causes and cure unknown.  As a result, research is a top priority.44 
Although autism research still has a very long way to go, it has made
some headway in recent years.  For example, research in genetics,
namely, family and twin studies and the recognition of the coexistence 
of autism with a number of genetic disorders, points to a substantial 
genetic contribution to autism “and has strengthened the case for viewing it
as an essentially biological disorder.”45  Research in neuroscience, including 
postmortem studies and brain imaging, has “attempted to identify
distinctive anatomical, physiological and biochemical features of the
‘autistic brain,’”46 while psychological research has “clarified some of
the distinctive characteristics of autistic thought and behaviour.”47 
According to the APA, “[E]vidence for the biological basis of autism
is growing with studies demonstrating variable support and variable
explanatory power for biological variables,” including associations
between autism and “biological markers (e.g., neurotransmitter levels),
neuroimaging results (e.g., brain volume), head circumference (e.g., 
macrocephaly), electrophysiological testing (e.g., ERP, EEG) and
neuropsychological assessments (e.g., face processing).”48  Many in the 
medical mainstream believe that “the distinctive clinical presentations of 
autism can be linked to some, as yet unidentified, deficit in neurological 
function, which in turn can be traced back to some, also unidentified, 
genetic defect, perhaps conferring susceptibility to some, still unknown, 
environmental agent.”49  For them, “[I]t is only a matter of time before
44. See Caruso, supra note 22, at 493. 
45. See FITZPATRICK, supra note 1, at 78 (stating that 10% of autism cases coexist 
with other known genetic conditions, such as Down’s syndrome, and that in 70% of
cases involving identical twins, both have autism, as opposed to only 5% of cases 
involving nonidentical twins). 
46. Id. at 8; see also BARON-COHEN, supra note 21, at 137 (“There is evidence of 
brain dysfunction (such as epilepsy) in a proportion of cases.  There is also evidence of
structural and functional differences in regions of the brain (such as the amygdala being 
abnormal in size, and less responsive to emotional cues).”). 
47. FITZPATRICK, supra note 1, at 9. 
48. Michael B. First, Autism and Other Pervasive Developmental Disorders
Conference (February 3–5, 2008), AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N DSM-V DEV., http://www. 
dsm5.org/Research/Pages/AutismandOtherPervasiveDevelopmentalDisordersConference
%28February3-5,2008%29.aspx (last visited Feb. 4, 2012). 








   
  













   
  









the key links in the causal chain extending from genes through brain to 
autistic mind are identified—and therapeutic interventions discovered.”50 
Medical research into autism raises a multitude of ethical concerns.51 
This sub-Part will discuss the ethical concerns that arise with respect to
one of the uses to which medical research is put—prenatal testing and 
embryo selection—and some of the methods used to fund it—Autism 
Speaks’s fundraising tactics.
a. Prenatal Testing and Embryo Selection 
Mainstream science points to “a strong and unambiguous genetic
component [to autism] that may explain as much as 80–90% of the risk 
for autism.”52  It also suggests that a number of different genes may be at
work, with estimates ranging from 10 to over 100.53 According to one
author:
Notwithstanding the slow and, at times, frustrating progress in characterizing
the genetic factors contributing to autism, many scientific experts in the field
are optimistic that clinically useful genetic markers of autism have been, or will
soon be, identified as a result of new genetic technologies and increased funding
of research.54 
Most would agree that autism presents a host of challenges for autistic
people and their families.55  Genetic research may help meet some of 
these challenges.  Because autism is currently diagnosed based on 
behavioral criteria, parents are often unaware that their child is autistic
until the child is two or three years old.56  Genetic testing may give
parents a few months’ or even a few years’ head start—watching for 
autism’s features in a child with a genetic predisposition toward autism, 
and getting themselves educated and their child services sooner rather
than later.57  It may also lead to better pharmacological treatments.58 
50. Id. 
51. Gary E. Marchant & Jason S. Robert, Genetic Testing for Autism 
Predisposition: Ethical, Legal, and Social Challenges, 9 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
203, 219 (2009). 
52. Id. at 204–05. 
53. Id. at 213. 
54. Id. at 215. 
55. See Letter from Ari Ne’eman, President of the Autistic Self Advocacy 
Network, to Sponsors, Donors, and Supporters of Autism Speaks (Oct. 7, 2009), 
http://www.autisticadvocacy.org/modules/smartsection/item.php?itemid=61 (stating that 
autism “comes with significant challenges in a wide variety of realms”).
56. Screening and Diagnosis, Autism Spectrum Disorders, CTR. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION (May 13, 2010), http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/
screening.html (“By age 2, a diagnosis [of autism] by an experienced professional can be 
considered very reliable.  However, many children do not receive a final diagnosis until 
much older.” (footnote omitted)).
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With more tailored and effective drugs, an autistic child might be better 
able to cope with the stresses of a nonautistic world. 
Although a cure and treatment for autism are among the goals of
genetic research, another goal will inevitably be prevention, that is,
“prenatal tests and embryo selection techniques that inform prospective 
parents about future children.”59  Although some prospective parents 
“will seek out information yielded by the tests even if they intend to 
continue a pregnancy regardless of the finding,” many more will use this 
information “to decide whether to carry a particular fetus to
term.”60  Down’s syndrome is a case in point: about 90% of pregnancies 
testing positive for the condition are terminated.61 
This raises several ethical concerns, some common to conditions with 
a genetic component, others unique to autism.  First, having the gene or 
genes at issue does not necessarily mean having autism—susceptibility
is not the same as certainty.62  “Like many complex diseases, autism 
appears to result from an interaction of environmental and genetic 
factors. . . .  Not every child carrying an autism predisposing gene will 
develop autism . . . .”63  But “[p]eople often misunderstand the implications
of their genetic data, believing that a genetic predisposition necessarily 
results in the development of their illness.”64  Given these difficulties in 
comprehension, how informed should parental consent be?  Should doctors 
and other medical professionals be required to counsel parents in the 
myriad ways that the life of an autistic child may resemble those of his 
or her peers, “focusing on capacities for education, stimulation, play, and
relationships,” or in the ways that autistic life may be different but
nevertheless fulfilling?65  Furthermore, “[a]s with any genetic test, some 
58. See id. at 225–26; cf. Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., Restoring the ADA and Beyond: 
Disability in the 21st Century, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 241, 322 (2008) (noting benefits of
the first genetically engineered medicine, synthetic insulin).
59. Adrienne Asch, Disability Equality and Prenatal Testing: Contradictory or 
Compatible?, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 315, 336 (2003); see also Majia Holmer Nadesan,
Constructing Autism: A Brief Genealogy, in AUTISM AND REPRESENTATION 78, 90 (Mark
Osteen ed., 2008) (“[T]he identification of susceptibility genes will inevitably lead to 
development of techniques for prenatal screening.”).
60. Asch, supra note 59, at 336. 
61. See Amy Harmon, Prenatal Test Puts Down Syndrome in Hard Focus, N.Y.
TIMES, May 9, 2007, at A1. 
62. See Marchant & Robert, supra note 51, at 220. 
63. Id. at 229. 
64. Id. at 220 (citing Ellen Wright Clayton, Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications 
of Genomic Medicine, 349 N. ENG. J. MED. 562, 563 (2003)). 




   
 
   
 
 











   
 
 
level of false positives [is] to be expected.”66  Does the risk of having a
child with autism outweigh the risk of terminating a nonautistic pregnancy 
or not proceeding with the implantation of a nonautistic embryo? 
Second, when it comes to autism, parents’ uncertainty is compounded 
because autism is not a single, uniform condition—it is extremely
variable.67  Even if parents know that their unborn child will have a
substantial likelihood of developing autism because of this or that gene, 
doctors may not be able to tell them what form that autism may take.68 
Is it the nonverbal child they do not wish to bear or the verbal but socially 
awkward one?  And if research progresses to a point where doctors do
know, are they obligated to tell parents everything they know, or will 
mainstream medicine draw a line, informing parents of only certain
kinds of autism?69 
Lastly, even assuming that consent is informed and the form of autism 
susceptibility is reasonably certain, what impact will prenatal testing and 
embryo selection have on autistic people’s and others’ views of their 
inherent worth as human beings?70  Can these genetic procedures 
“comfortably coexist with society’s professed goals of promoting
inclusion and equality for people with disabilities”?71  Or do such 
procedures send a message that autistic lives may not be worth living or 
may be too great an imposition for families and the rest of society to 
bear?72  As Professor Adrienne Asch explains, singling out particular 
impairments, or certain variants of those impairments, for testing is 
tricky business because it inevitably stigmatizes those on the “list”: 
[C]reating an official list of conditions that parents should worry about will 
have an undesirable effect on the societal acceptance and self-esteem of those 
with the listed conditions.  Why should it be acceptable to avoid some 
characteristics and not others?  How can the society make lists of acceptable
and unacceptable tests and still maintain that only disabling traits, and not 
people who live with those traits, are to be avoided?  If it is legitimate to be a
66. Marchant & Robert, supra note 51, at 229. 
67. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. 
68. Marchant & Robert, supra note 51, at 220, 233 (discussing “infeasibility of an
accurate prenatal test given the genetic heterogeneity and variable expression of autistic 
disorders”); see also Nadesan, supra note 59, at 90 (“[C]ausal and mechanistic models of 
gene action are unlikely to explain or predict the range of autistic conditions or the 
severity of autistic symptoms.”). 
69. See Marchant & Robert, supra note 51, at 220; see also Asch, supra note 59, at 
338–39 (discussing ethical concerns with clinicians’ decision to inform prospective 
parents of susceptibility to some impairments but not others). 
70. See Marchant & Robert, supra note 51, at 232. 
71. Asch, supra note 59, at 315. 
72. See id.  Prenatal testing gives rise to some of disability law’s most vexing 
questions.  For a good introduction to some of these questions, see BAGENSTOS, supra




















   
 
 
[VOL. 49:  161, 2012] Gray Matters 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
person with a disability, or to parent a child with such a disabling condition,
should the society make a list of “serious” and “trivial” characteristics?73 
Many in the autism community argue against genetic research or at
least suggest that such research proceed with caution.74  Ari Ne’eman, a
member of the President’s National Council on Disability and Founding 
President of the Autism Self-Advocacy Network (ASAN), a “nonprofit 
organization run by and for Autistic people,”75 sees “serious problems 
with taxpayer and well-meaning charitable funds going toward [genetic] 
research” and stresses that “not every dollar given toward autism causes 
is helpful to autistic people.”76  Professor Simon Baron-Cohen, director 
of Cambridge University’s Autism Research Centre, likewise warns of 
genetic research’s unintended consequences: “Caution is needed before
scientists embrace prenatal testing so that we do not inadvertently repeat
the history of eugenics or inadvertently ‘cure’ not just autism but the 
associated talents that are not in need of treatment.”77 
b. “You Are Scared, and You Should Be”: Fundraising 
for Autism Research
Autism Speaks, founded in 2005, is the nation’s “largest autism science
and advocacy organization.”78  Like many advocacy organizations, Autism
Speaks raises funds by raising public awareness: from lobbying for 
federal moneys on Capitol Hill to soliciting major gifts from corporate 
and private donors; from organizing local fundraising events such as 
Walk Now for Autism Speaks across the country to establishing the United 
Nations-sanctioned World Autism Awareness Day on April 2; and from 
launching national media campaigns about autism to recruiting celebrity
73. Asch, supra note 59, at 339. 
74. See, e.g., Research and Data Collection, AUTISTIC SELF ADVOC. NETWORK, 
http://www.autisticadvocacy.org/modules/smartsection/category.php?categoryid=80 (last
visited Feb. 4, 2012) (noting “potential eugenic consequences” associated with “genetic 
and other causation-oriented studies”); ASPIES FOR FREEDOM, http://www.aspiesfor 
freedom.com/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2012) (advocating for “prevent[ion of] eugenic
elimination of autistic people by opposing pre-natal testing for autism”). 
75. AUTISTIC SELF ADVOC. NETWORK, http://www.autisticadvocacy.org (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2012). 
76. Solomon, supra note 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
77. See Simon Baron-Cohen, Autism Test ‘Could Hit Maths Skills,’ BBC NEWS, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/7736196.stm (last updated Jan. 7, 2009). 
78. About Us, AUTISM SPEAKS, http://www.autismspeaks.org/about-us (last visited 










   
   
  
 















spokespeople.79  Autism Speaks has something to show for all of this.  In
2005, only $15 million in privately raised funds went to autism.  Since 
that time, Autism Speaks has committed “over $142.5 million to research 
through 2014.”80 
Autism Speaks’s advocacy efforts have also helped to expand federal
funding of autism research.  Following on the heels of the Children’s
Health Act of 2000, which, among other things, required the National 
Institutes of Health to “expand, intensify, and coordinate” research on
autism,81 
[t]he 2006 Combating Autism Act . . . provided for approximately $950 million
in spending on autism over five years, divided among research and other 
programs, and was subsequently funded accordingly. . . .  In President Obama’s
2011 budget proposal, overall federal research and development funding is set 
to decline slightly from 2010 levels, but funding for autism research is actually
82 set to increase. 
In raising awareness about autism, Autism Speaks emphasizes the 
need to find a cure for autism.  This goal, of course, carries with it the
implicit, but nevertheless powerful, message that autism “is unacceptable; a
cure must be found,” and that anyone living with autism “should not be 
content with her current condition.”83  But Autism Speaks’s awareness 
campaigns are not always so subtle.  Time-tested pity and fear tactics are
hallmarks of its advocacy84 and have drawn the ire of many in the autism 
and broader disability community. 
In 2009, Autism Speaks unveiled its “I Am Autism” video at the 
second annual United Nations World Focus on Autism.85  The  
79. See Annual Report: 2009, AUTISM SPEAKS, http://www.autismspeaks.org/docs/
Autism_Speaks_Annual_Report_2009.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2012). 
80. See Press Release, Autism Speaks, New Autism Genes Discovered: Autism 
Speaks and the World’s Leading Autism Experts Announce Phase 2 Results of the 
Autism Genome Project (June 9, 2010), http://www.autismspeaks.org/press/autism_
genome_project_nature.php. 
81. 42 U.S.C. § 284g (2006). 
82. Caruso, supra note 22, at 493 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
83. Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn’t “Just Right”: The Entrenchment of
the Medical Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 IND. L.J. 181, 202–04 
(2008) (discussing cures and campaigns generally).
84. See  OLIVER, supra note 10, at 93 (stating that the “prime objective” of many 
disability advocacy organizations “is to maximise income, regardless of the image
presented,” and that many organizations “are quite shameless in the way they reinforce
th[e] image” of disabled people as “burdens of charity. . . . through their fund-raising 
campaigns”). 
85. See Do You Want To Be in a World Autism Video?, AUTISM SPEAKS, http:// 
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video features black-and-white footage of autistic children alone and 
the sinister-sounding,86 anthropomorphized voice of autism, stating: 
I am autism.  I’m visible in your children, but if I can help it, I am invisible to
you until it’s too late.  I know where you live.  And guess what? I live there too.
I hover around all of you.  I know no color barrier, no religion, no morality, no
currency.  I speak your language fluently.  And with every voice I take 
away, I acquire yet another language.  I work very quickly.  I work faster
than pediatric AIDS, cancer, and diabetes combined.  And if you’re happily
married, I will make sure that your marriage fails.  Your money will fall into my
hands, and I will bankrupt you for my own self-gain.  I don’t sleep, so I make 
sure you don’t either.  I will make it virtually impossible for your family to
easily attend a temple, birthday party, or public park without a struggle, without 
embarrassment, without pain.  You have no cure for me.  Your scientists don’t 
have the resources, and I relish their desperation.  Your neighbors are happier to 
pretend that I don’t exist—of course, until it’s their child.  I am autism.  I have
no interest in right or wrong.  I derive great pleasure out of your loneliness. 
I will fight to take away your hope.  I will plot to rob you of your children and
your dreams.  I will make sure that every day you wake up, you will cry,
wondering who will take care of my child after I die?  And the truth is, I am still 
winning, and you are scared.  And you should be.  I am autism.  You ignored
me.  That was a mistake.87 
The second half of the video features color footage of the parents of 
autistic children speaking out against autism:
We will spend every waking hour trying to weaken you. . . . We search with 
technology and voodoo and prayer and herbs and genetic studies . . . . We 
speak the only language that matters: love for our children. . . .  Autism is naive. 
You are alone. . . .  You think because some of our children cannot speak, we 
cannot hear them?  That is autism’s weakness.  You think that because my child
lives behind a wall, I am afraid to knock it down with my bare hands? . . . 
Autism, if you are not scared, you should be.  When you came for my child, you
forgot: you came for me.88 
The video ends with footage of autistic children smiling with their
families. 
86. The video was created by Academy Award-nominated director Alfonso 
Cuarón, director of the third Harry Potter installment. Id.; Biography for Alfonso Cuarón, 
IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0190859/bio (last visited Jan. 15, 2012). 
87. Horrific Autism Speaks “I Am Autism” Ad Transcript, AUTISTIC SELF ADVOC. 
NETWORK (Sept. 23, 2009), http://www.autisticadvocacy.org/modules/smartsection/ 
item.php?itemid=58.  Although the video is no longer available on YouTube, several 
autism parodies are.  E.g., I Am Autism, YOUTUBE (Sept. 27, 2009), http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=a4IKKlOnx_I; I Am Autism Speaks (Now with Added Sub-Titles), 
YOUTUBE (Sept. 24, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yU2paLv1MGE. 





























   
The “I Am Autism” video sparked an immediate outcry from many in 
the autism and broader disability communities.  In an open letter to the
sponsors, donors, and supporters of Autism Speaks, then-ASAN President 
Ari Ne’eman and over sixty international, national, and local disability 
advocacy groups called for an end to support for Autism Speaks.89 
Specifically, ASAN charged Autism Speaks with “us[ing] damaging and 
offensive fundraising tactics which rely on fear [and] stereotypes,” 
thereby “devaluing the lives” of the very people for whom they purport 
to speak.90  According to ASAN:
Contrary to the “I am Autism” video, which equates autism with AIDS and 
Cancer, autism is not a terminal disease.  It is a disability, one that comes with 
significant challenges in a wide variety of realms.  Yet the answer to those
challenges is not to create a world in which people are afraid of people on the 
autism spectrum. . . .  It is to work to create a society that recognizes the civil
rights of Autistic people and others with disabilities.  It is to work to create a
world in which people with disabilities can benefit from the supports, the 
services and the educational tools necessary to empower them to be full citizens
in society.91 
ASAN called the video the most recent offense in a “pattern of
unethical behavior” that uses the theme of “fear, pity and prejudice” to
advance a misguided agenda.92  A prior series of Autism Speaks public
service announcements compared “having a child on the autism spectrum 
to having a child caught in a fatal car accident or struck by lightning,”93 
and in a 2006 Autism Speaks fundraising film, the then-senior vice
president of Autism Speaks told of how she once contemplated placing 
her autistic daughter “in the car and driving off the George Washington
Bridge.”94 
The ASAN letter also charged Autism Speaks with undermining the 
autonomy of autistic people by failing to prioritize social services and
89. Letter from Ari Ne’eman, President of the Autistic Self Advocacy Network, to





94. FITZPATRICK, supra note 1, at 47 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Autism 
Speaks’s predecessor, Cure Autism Now, which merged with Autism Speaks in 2007, 
launched a strikingly similar ad campaign years before. See Press Release, Autism Speaks,
Autism Speaks and Cure Autism Now Complete Merger (Feb. 5, 2007), http://www.
autismspeaks.org/about-us/press-releases/autism-speaks-and-cure-autism-now-complete-
merger (discussing merger).  As Professor Hacking explains, “After a bit of ominous 
music, an intensely concerned young father intones, ‘Imagine that aliens were stealing
one in every two hundred children. . . .  That is what is happening in America today.  It is 
called autism.’” Hacking, supra note 2, at 44. 
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change its governance structure.95  The letter noted that Autism Speaks 
devotes only a small amount of its budget (4%) toward researching and 
providing social and educational supports for autistic people, while 
spending the bulk of its budget (65%) on genetic and biomedical
research, “including the prospect of prenatal testing.”96  Autism Speaks’s
“refus[al] to include any individual with the disability they purport to 
serve on their board of directors or at any point in their leadership and
decision-making processes,” the letter further stated, is “deeply
unrepresentative and out of step with the mainstream of the disability 
non-profit community.”97 
Echoing the sentiments raised in ASAN’s letter, many in the autism 
community lamented Autism Speaks’s depiction of autism as “a devil 
personified”98 and warned against conflating autistic children’s actual 
experience with parents’ despairing perceptions of that experience.99 
Others noted that Autism Speaks’s video was particularly objectionable
given its close similarities to New York University Child Study Center’s 
2006 Ransom Notes autism ad campaign, which was widely denounced 
by the autism community and was withdrawn just three weeks after it
began.100  That campaign featured advertisements in the form of ransom
notes, one of which read, “We have your son.  We will make sure he will
not be able to care for himself or interact socially as long as he lives. 
This is only the beginning.”  It was signed Autism.101  Another read, “We
have your son.  We are destroying his ability for social interaction and 
95. Letter from Ari Ne’eman, President of the Autistic Self Advocacy Network, to
Sponsors, Donors, and Supporters of Autism Speaks, supra note 55. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. See, e.g., Codeman38, Autism Speaks Hits a New Low, DAILY KOS (Sept. 23, 
2009, 12:04 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2009/9/23/785559/-Autism-Speaks-
Hits-A-New-Low; Emily Willingham, What if Someone Did This with, Say, Down’s
Syndrome?, LIFE LESS ORDINARY (Sept. 22, 2009), http://daisymayfattypants.blogspot. 
com/2009/09/what-if-someone-did-this-with-say-downs.html. 
99. See, e.g., KWombles, Autism Speaks Should Learn when To Shut the Hell Up: I Am 
Autism. Not., COUNTERING . . . (Sept. 23, 2009), http://kwomblescountering.blogspot. 
com/2009/09/autism-speaks-should-learn-when-to-shut.html; Sarah, Who Does Autism
Speaks Speak for? (Or, the Diagnostic Double Standard), CAT DOG’S WORLD (Sept. 25, 2009, 
10:01 AM), http://autisticcats.blogspot.com/2009/09/who-does-autism-speaks-speak-for.html; 
Theo, Comment to I’m Pissed!!, ASPIE WEB (Oct. 5, 2009, 10:15 AM), http://www. 
aspieweb.net/autism-speaks-i-am/. 
100. See When Will They Listen?, CLUB 166 (Sept. 23, 2009, 4:06 AM), http://club 
166.blogspot.com/2009/09/when-will-they-listen.html; see also Solomon, supra note 2
(discussing NYU’s 2006 Ransom Notes campaign). 



















   





driving him into a life of complete isolation.  It’s up to you now.”  It was 
signed Asperger Syndrome.102  
2. “Autism as Toxic”: Alternative Medicine and Chelation 
All of the research in the world is of little comfort to overwhelmed 
parents who want help for their children now.  With no cure in sight, 
many parents attempt to modify their children’s undesirable behavior 
through a variety of therapeutic interventions.103  Some of these interventions
are conventional, like the prescription of stimulants such as Ritalin, 
antidepressants such as Prozac, and antianxiety agents such as Buspar,104 
while others fall into the alternative or “biomedical” camp.105 
For many parents who turn to biomedical interventions, autism is an 
epidemic, and time is of the essence.106  Some blog about “hating
autism”107 and convey their level of disdain through metaphor, comparing 
autism to a “beast’s shadow” under which they live, a stealer of souls, an 
alien abductor, and a condition that “relentlessly sucks life’s marrow out
of the family members, one by one.”108 
Because mainstream medicine offers few answers and little hope in 
the short term, parents who pursue biomedical interventions are oftentimes 
distrustful of, and even openly hostile toward, mainstream medicine.109 
In particular, these parents are dismissive of mainstream medicine’s
focus on the role that genetics plays in autism.110  For them, it is our
toxic environment—not some unidentified genetic defect, perhaps
conferring susceptibility to some unknown environmental agent—that
is to blame for autism.111  And that means hope, for if we can identify 
the environmental factor or factors that cause autism, we can prevent 
autism, treat it, and maybe even cure it.112 
102. Id.
 103. NADESAN, supra note 43, at 194. 
104. Id.
 105. FITZPATRICK, supra note 1, at 11. 
106. Id. at 15. 
 107. HATING AUTISM BLOG, http://hatingautism.blogspot.com (last visited Feb. 4,
2012). 
 108. FITZPATRICK, supra note 1, at 43–44 (quoting Jerry J. Kartzinel, Introduction 
to JENNY MCCARTHY, LOUDER THAN WORDS: A MOTHER’S JOURNEY IN HEALING AUTISM, 
at xvi (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hacking, supra note 2, at 50 
(“‘I want my grandson back!’  The metaphor of abduction feels overpowering to some
families; a baby that was a lovely human being has disappeared.” (quoting the CEO of
NBC Universal and grandfather of autistic child)). 
109. See NADESAN, supra note 43, at 194. 
 110. FITZPATRICK, supra note 1, at 11. 
111. See id. at 9, 19–22, 84–87; see also Caruso, supra note 22, at 496 (discussing 
the biomedical movement). 
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For these parents, potential environmental culprits are everywhere: in 
the food we eat (for example, pesticides, MSG); in the medication we 
take and medical procedures we undergo (for example, vaccines,113 
antibiotics, reproductive and hormonal drugs, prenatal ultrasounds, and
early clamping of the umbilical cord); in the technology we use for work
and play (for example, television and WiFi); in the sounds we hear (for 
example, mechanically generated noise); and in the air we breathe, the
water we drink, the ground we walk on, and the energy we produce (for 
example, electromagnetic and nuclear radiation, chemical waste, heavy
metal residues).114  All have been blamed for causing autism.  Given the 
breadth of potential causes, potential remedies run the gamut: from
special diets (for example, wheat-free or dairy-free); to supplements (for
example, vitamins, amino acids); to medication (for example, antibiotics,
antifungals, anti-inflammatories); to medical procedures aimed at extracting 
toxic metals from the blood (chelation), stimulating blood-vessel formation
(stem cell therapy), and improving blood circulation (hyperbaric oxygen
therapy); to much-publicized antivaccine campaigns.115 
The efficacy of biomedical interventions is debatable.  Although many 
supporters of biomedical interventions claim that autism is not only 
treatable but also curable by this or that intervention, the studies upon
which they rely generally have numerous “methodological defects that 
render their conclusions unreliable.”116  These defects, together with 
autism’s variability among individuals, autism’s evolution over the
113. “Autistic symptoms often become visible at age 18 months, exactly when 
children are routinely vaccinated against measles, mumps, and rubella.”  Caruso, supra
note 22, at 501–02.  According to antivaccine advocates, the measles-mumps-rubella 
(MMR) vaccine, in combination with several vaccines containing the mercury-based 
preservative thimerosol, can damage a “child’s immune system, resulting in an immune
deficiency that prevent[s] her from being able to ‘clear from her body the measles virus 
contained in the MMR.’”  John Thomas, Paranoia Strikes Deep: MMR Vaccine and 
Autism, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (Mar. 5, 2010), http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/autistic-
disorder/content/article/10168/1531916 (quoting Cedillo v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 89 Fed. Cl. 158, 163 (2009)).  The virus, in turn, “cause[s] inflammatory bowel 
disease and also ‘enter[s] the child’s brain, causing inflammation and autism.’”  Id.
(quoting Cedillo, 89 Fed. Cl. at 163).  The legal debate surrounding the causal link 
between vaccines and autism is beyond the scope of this Article.
114. See FITZPATRICK, supra note 1, at 19–22, 84–87; see also Marchant & Robert, 
supra note 51, at 216 (discussing suspected environmental causes of autism). 
 115. FITZPATRICK, supra note 1, at 115, 131. 
116. Id. at 131 (stating that “[m]ost interventions are endorsed by small studies, 
carried out by sympathetic researchers in collaboration with supportive parents, using
biased methods of selection, subjective measures of outcome, lacking in control groups 











   
  
 
   



















lifetime of each individual, and “the difficult[y in] isolat[ing] the effects
of any particular intervention from the range of other” interventions that
a child may be receiving, make it difficult to draw solid conclusions
about which interventions work.117 
The safety of biomedical interventions is also debatable.  Although 
“biomedical diets and supplements, though not without some risks, do 
not raise major concerns about safety,” the same is not true for
medications, which “are no safer in the hands of biomedical practitioners
than they are in those of mainstream doctors,” and for certain medical
procedures advocated by the biomedical movement.118  Chelation is a
case in point. 
On July 22, 2005, Marwa Nadama, the mother of a five-year-old
autistic boy named Abubakar Tariq, took her son to Advance Integrative 
Medicine, Inc. in Pennsylvania for biomedical treatment.  Dr. Roy Kerry
determined that Tariq’s treatment would include the use of chelation
therapy, which involves the “administration of a synthetic chemical 
solution which is designed to extract certain heavy metals from the body,
the theory being that such heavy metals contribute to a variety of
illnesses including autism.”119  First used during the First World War to
treat victims of poison gas, chelation therapy has achieved prominence
among alternative health practitioners in recent decades as a treatment
for medical and psychiatric disorders attributed to environmental toxins, 
as well as for coronary heart disease.120 “In more recent years, as the 
notion that autism is caused by vaccines containing mercury has become
increasingly popular, practitioners have begun to offer chelation as a 
treatment for autistic children, using a wide variety of agents, in oral,
injectable or even transdermal forms.”121 
Dr. Kerry prescribed a series of treatments involving the intravenous
administration of disodium EDTA, the chelator agent commonly used to
treat heart disease and known to carry a risk of irregular heart rhythms,
seizures, and even death.122  The first and second administrations occurred
in July and early August, respectively, without incident—although Tariq
had to be restrained by four adults using a “papoose board,” which is 
“a flat wooden board with attached fabric straps which are wrapped 
around the child’s body and limbs to prevent struggling during
117. Id. at 131–32. 
118. Id. at 132. 
119. Complaint ¶ 16, Nadama v. Kerry (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2007), available at
http://www.circare.org/lex/nadama_complaint.pdf. 
 120. FITZPATRICK, supra note 1, at 5. 
121. Id.
 122. Id.; Complaint, supra note 119, ¶ 16. 
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treatment.”123 On August 23, 2005, shortly after the administration of
the third treatment, “Tariq Nadama went into cardiac arrest.  CPR and 
chest compression were given, but the child could not be revived . . . . 
[and] was pronounced dead shortly after arriving at the hospital.”124 
News of Tariq Nadama’s death ignited a firestorm of debate in the 
world of autism.  Biomedical advocates defended the safety and efficacy
of chelation therapy and asserted that “the boy’s death resulted, quite 
simply, from a drug error”—Dr. Kerry had used the wrong drug.125 
Many adult autistics blasted back, calling Tariq’s death “tragic, needless,”
and the consequence of “the whole ‘cure’ mentality.  It creates a dynamic in
which nearly any risk is acceptable in fighting the autism, because living 
with autism, as they see it, is a fate even worse than death.”126 
And the war goes on:
A 2008 study [evaluating] the quality of research on various autism treatments
gave chelation the lowest possible grade, saying there are no controlled trials on
the safety and effectiveness of chelation as an autism treatment. . . .  That same
year, the National Institutes of Health canceled plans to run a clinical trial on
chelation for the treatment of autism in children, saying the risks outweighed
any potential benefit.127 
And in October 2010, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
issued letters warning several companies that it is a violation of the law
to market over-the-counter chelation products.128  In those letters, the
FDA noted that chelation’s efficacy in treating autism and other
conditions is “unsubstantiated,” and that there are “serious safety issues
associated with chelation products, which can alter the levels of certain
substances in the blood. . . . [and] cause serious harm, including 
dehydration, kidney failure, and death.”129  Nevertheless, many children
 123. FITZPATRICK, supra note 1, at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
 124. Complaint, supra note 119, ¶ 18. 
 125. Bernard Rimland, Chelation: The Story Behind the Headlines, AUTISM RES. 
REV. INT’L, no. 3, 2005, at 3, 3.
 126. FITZPATRICK, supra note 1, at 8 (quoting autistic blogger Joe Klein) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 127. Nancy Shute, FDA Comes Down on Chelation as Untested Autism Treatment, 
U.S. NEWS  & WORLD REP. (Oct. 15, 2010), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/
managing-your-healthcare/brain-and-behavior/articles/2010/10/15/fda-comes-down-on-
chelation-as-untested-autism-treatment.
128. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Issues Warnings to Marketers 







   
  












   
 
 













continue to receive chelation therapy each year as biomedical advocates 
champion its safety and efficacy.130  
B.  “Autism as Way of Being”: Neurodiversity and Applied      
Behavioral Analysis 
The neurodiversity movement originated in the 1990s in response to
the dominant conception of autism as a disorder and consists primarily
of generally high-functioning autistic adults and their families.131 As 
epitomized by Jim Sinclair’s Don’t Mourn for Us, the neurodiversity
movement’s central claim is that autism is not a disorder but a way of 
being or, more specifically, a “different” way of being, of thinking, of 
behaving.132 Accordingly, the neurodiversity movement focuses on
“acceptance and even admiration for autism’s most appealing traits,
which range from savant-like musicality to a philosophical detachment 
from most mundane matters.”133 
With the Internet as their “sign language”134 or “prosthetic limb,”135 
autistic people “are beginning to see themselves not as blighted individuals,
but as a different ethnicity, [and] ‘[i]n a sense, autistics are constituting 
themselves as a new immigrant group online, sailing to strange 
130. See Bernard Rimland, The Safety and Efficacy of Chelation Therapy in Autism, 
AUTISM RES. INST., http://www.autism.com/pro_chelationsafety.asp (last visited Feb. 4,
2012) (“Tens of thousands of children and hundreds of thousands of adults have been
treated safely with chelation therapy for many decades.”).
131. See Solomon, supra note 2; see also Caruso, supra note 22, at 495 (discussing
the neurodiversity movement).  The neurodiversity movement does not represent the 
experience of all autistic adults, of course.  See BARON-COHEN, supra note 21, at 145–46 
(“[D]o I wish I hadn’t been born with [Asperger’s]?  Yes, I hate my [Asperger’s], and if 
I could be rid of it I would. . . . Every day is like climbing Mount Everest in lead boots, 
covered in molasses.  Every step in every part of my life is a struggle.” (quoting autistic
adults) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Interestingly, the neurodiversity movement 
is not limited to those who communicate verbally.  See Sanjay Gupta, Behind the Veil of
Autism, CNN (Feb. 20, 2007, 10:57 AM), http://www.cnn.com/HEALTH/blogs/paging.
dr.gupta/2007/02/behind-veil-of-autism.html (interviewing autism rights activist Amanda
Baggs, who communicates through computer and voice synthesizer). 
132. See NADESAN, supra note 43, at 208–09 (quoting Sinclair, supra note 40); see 
also Nancy Bagatell, From Cure to Community: Transforming Notions of Autism, 38
ETHOS 33, 39–40 (2010) (stating that “[a]utistic socializing [does] not necessarily
require conversation,” and discussing “what Sinclair describes as ‘interactive stimming,
[this] kind of spontaneous sharing of pleasure in fixations and stimming’” (quoting Jim 
Sinclair, Autism Network Int’l: The Development of a Community and Its Culture, 
AUTISM NETWORK INT’L (2005), http://autreat.com/History_of_ANI.html)). 
 133. Caruso, supra note 22, at 495.
 134. Judy Singer, “Why Can’t You Be Normal for Once in Your Life?” From a
“Problem with No Name” to the Emergence of a New Category of Difference, in
DISABILITY DISCOURSE 59, 67 (Mairian Corker & Sally French eds., 1999) (quoting 
Harvey Blume, Autistics, Freed from Face-to-Face Encounters, Are Communicating in 
Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1997, at D6) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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neurological shores on the Internet.’”136  Autism websites proclaim Bill 
Gates, Albert Einstein, and Andy Warhol as “closet ‘aspies’”—they have 
or had, as the case may be, undiagnosed Asperger’s syndrome—and have
even coined a term for nonautistics: neurotypicals (NTs).137  Beyond 
the blogosphere, Hollywood, television, radio, literature, and outspoken 
autistic people such as Temple Grandin have popularized autistic people’s
contributions to math, science, and art.138  Magazines such as Wired and 
Time have called Asperger’s the “geek syndrome” and credited autistic
people with being the “dreamers and architects of our technological
future.”139 And academia has also weighed in, with anthropologists,
psychologists, philosophers, sociologists, historians, and others pointing 
to autistic features as “a different kind of intelligence”140 or “essence,”141 
“an expression of the glory of the human brain, in itself an unimaginably 
complex symphony,”142 “an overexpression of the very traits that make
our species unique,”143 “human, but more so,”144 a “ray of light,”145 and 
even “a unique, masculine cognitive style.”146 
 136. Singer, supra note 134, at 67 (quoting Blume, supra note 134); see also
Hacking, supra note 2, at 56 (“In retrospect, we shall almost certainly see today’s
Internet as making possible a form of life in which autistic people can thrive.  It is 
precisely the medium for human communication that does not depend on body language 
or eye contact . . . .”).
137. See  NADESAN, supra note 43, at 199; see also Hacking, supra note 2, at 46
(“Members of [the neurodiversity movement] agree that autism is a neurological condition,
but so, after all, is the state of what they call neurotypicals. . . .  The neurodiversity
movement rejects the idea that there is neuro-normality.”).
138. See NADESAN, supra note 43, at 205. 
139. J. Madeleine Nash, The Geek Syndrome, TIME, May 6, 2002, http://www. 
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1002365,00.html; Steve Silberman, The Geek
Syndrome, WIRED (Dec. 2001), http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/9.12/ aspergers_pr.html;
see also Andrew Watts, Traits, Diagnosis, and Social Aspects of Asperger Syndrome, 
ANDREW, http://srl2.tripod.com/andrew/asperger.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2012) (“An
interesting and positive trait that people with Asperger Syndrome have is that they
develop unique interests and become highly intelligent especially in their main area of 
interest[, which] . . . may include topics in astronomy, classification of plants and
animals, memorization of train schedules and other obscure but intriguing topics.”). 
 140. BARON-COHEN, supra note 21, at 149 (echoing findings of Austrian psychiatrist
Hans Asperger, who called “[t]he autistic personality . . . an extreme variant of male 
intelligence” (quoting Hans Asperger’s 1944 paper, Die ‘Autischen Psychopathen’ im
Kindesalter).  “Autism spectrum conditions . . . appear to affect males far more often 
than females.  In people diagnosed with high-functioning autism or [Asperger’s], the sex
ratio is at least ten males to every female.” Id. at 137. 
 141. NADESAN, supra note 43, at 207. 
 142. GRINKER, supra note 20, at 280. 
 143. PAUL COLLINS, NOT EVEN WRONG: ADVENTURES IN AUTISM 161 (2004). 










   
 
   





While celebrating autistic differences, the neurodiversity movement 
does not deny autism’s genetic roots, biological components, and
sometimes troublesome features—for example, self-injurious behavior.
Instead, the neurodiversity movement points to these biogenetic differences 
as “qualitatively different, rather than deficient, from typical minds” and
characterizes autism’s troubling features as “defense strategies mounted 
by the autistic mind” to cope with a nonautistic world.147  Both ASAN 
and Autism Network International (ANI), for example, are dedicated to 
providing support services to autistic people to help them “compensate, 
navigate, and function in the world”148 but are respectful of 
“characteristically autistic styles of relating to others” and eschew
“changing [autistic people] into non-autistic people.”149 
The neurodiversity movement’s distinction between difference and 
disorder is a somewhat vague one,150 but talk of cures and therapy for 
autism brings the distinction into focus.  Generally speaking, the
neurodiversity movement opposes research that seeks to eradicate autism 
and therapies that “normalize” children at the expense of valued autistic 
missing . . . . Other animals are social, but only humans are capable of abstract logic.
The autistic outhuman the humans, and we can scarcely recognize the result.”  Id.
 144. Mark Osteen, Autism and Representation: A Comprehensive Introduction, in
AUTISM AND REPRESENTATION, supra note 59, at 1, 16. 
 145. Hacking, supra note 2, at 45. 
 146. NADESAN, supra note 43, at 200. 
147. Id. at 207. 
148. Id. at 206
149. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Introducing ANI, AUTISM NETWORK INT’L, 
http://www.autreat.com/intro.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2012)).
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traits.151  Nowhere is this opposition more pronounced than in the area of
intensive behavioral therapy.152 
Although behavioral therapy has been used for decades to modify
undesirable behaviors, Dr. O. Ivar Lovaas is widely credited with having 
pioneered its use on children with autism.153  In 1987, Dr. Lovaas
published a report on the use of “applied behavioral analysis” (ABA) 
therapy on children with autism, showing improved outcomes in the
areas of “compliance, imitation, receptive and expressive language, and
peer integration.”154  Generally speaking, ABA “requires children to engage
in very specific responses to one-to-one demands” and uses “[p]ositive 
reinforcement in the form of rewards (candy, toys, etc.) . . . as the child’s
primary motivator. . . .  [B]ecause autistic children often resist ABA’s
highly structured and disciplined demands, the program tends to be quite 
intensive in terms of the efforts exerted by autistic children and 
151. Id. at 206–08; see also Burgdorf, supra note 58, at 327 (“Because of such
positive aspects, many people with Asperger’s live satisfying lives and would not choose 
to give up the advantages for the disadvantages if they had the choice.”); Alex Plank, 
Ten Myths About Autism—Debunked, WRONG PLANET, http://www.wrongplanet.net/ 
article361.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2012) (“Most autistics, in fact, do not want to be 
cured because they’ve already accepted autism as part of their personality, identity, and 
lifestyle.”).  The neurodiversity movement’s objections to cures and therapy closely 
parallel those of the deaf community.  As noted by I. King Jordan, former president of 
Gallaudet University, many people who are deaf “hold in common this resentment of
efforts to fix us.”  Burgdorf, supra note 58, at 324 (quoting I. King Jordan, The
Gallaudet Experience: Deafness and Disability, 120 PMLA 625, 626 (2008)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Harlan Lane, Constructions of Deafness, 10
DISABILITY & SOC’Y 171, 178 (1995) (stating that most “American Deaf people . . . 
would refuse an operation to eliminate what sets them apart,” and citing a U.S. survey in
which eight out of ten deaf adults reported that they would decline an implant operation
that would enable them to hear).  “[R]esearch in genetics to improve deaf people’s
quality of life is certainly important . . . but must not become, in the hands of hearing
people, research on ways of reducing the deaf minority.” Id.
152. See FITZPATRICK, supra note 1, at 141; see also Colleen D. Holland, Note,
Autism, Insurance, and the IDEA: Providing a Comprehensive Legal Framework, 95 
CORNELL L. REV. 1253, 1263 (2010) (discussing the neurodiversity movement’s 
objections to ABA). 
 153. Holland, supra note 152, at 1257. 
 154. NADESAN, supra note 43, at 192 (citing BRYNA SIEGEL, THE WORLD OF THE 
AUTISTIC CHILD: UNDERSTANDING AND TREATING AUTISTIC SPECTRUM DISORDERS (1996)); 
see also GRINKER, supra note 20, at 177 (discussing purported benefits of ABA). 
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therapists.”155 Given its purported effectiveness, ABA is now one of the
most favored therapies for children with autism.156 
Those in the neurodiversity movement object to ABA on a number of
grounds.  These objections were perhaps best articulated by an autistic
woman named Michelle Dawson in a 2004 case before the Supreme
Court of Canada, Auton v. British Columbia.157  At issue in that case was 
whether Canadian law guaranteed funding for “medically necessary”
services and, if so, whether British Columbia’s failure to provide funding 
for ABA violated Canadian law.158  In her Factum of the Intervenor, Ms.
Dawson challenged the premise that autistic people “require ‘medically
necessary’ early intensive behaviour intervention . . ., based on the
principles of Applied Behaviour Analysis.”159  The court held that Canadian
law guarantees funding only for services provided by physicians and 
therefore British Columbia’s decision not to fund ABA—which is
performed by nonphysicians—was within its discretion.160  Citing Ms. 
Dawson’s Factum, the court also noted that ABA “is not uncontroversial,”
with objections “rang[ing] from its reliance in its early years on crude 
and arguably painful stimuli, to its goal of changing the child’s mind and
personality.”161 
Ms. Dawson’s Factum begins with the proposition that autism is
“a difference” to be respected and even celebrated, not a disorder to be 
eradicated: 
 155. NADESAN, supra note 43, at 192 (citation omitted) (citing SIEGEL, supra note 
154). 
 156. Holland, supra note 152, at 1257.  Despite its popularity, ABA’s effectiveness 
is controversial.  Studies show that “some children with autism benefit from ABA and 
some do not; some benefit more than others; and some children make progress without 
intensive behavioural intervention (and to a degree comparable with those who receive 
it).” FITZPATRICK, supra note 1, at 140. 
157. Factum of the Intervenor Michelle Dawson, Auton v. British Columbia, [2004]
3 S.C.R. 657 (Can.) (No. 29508), available at http://www.sentex.net/~nexus23/naa_ 
fac.html.  Although many commentators consider Ms. Dawson a member of the
neurodiversity movement, see, e.g., FITZPATRICK, supra note 1, at 12, Ms. Dawson,
herself, does not.  See Michelle Dawson, Elizabeth Svoboda’s Autism Culture Movement:
A Letter, AUTISM CRISIS (Apr. 27, 2009), http://autismcrisis.blogspot.com/2009/04/
elizabeth-svobodas-autism-culture.html.  Nevertheless, because many of Ms. Dawson’s 
criticisms of ABA parallel those of the neurodiversity movement, see, e.g., Therapies 
and Health Care, AUTISTIC SELF ADVOC. NETWORK, http://www.autisticadvocacy.org/ 
modules/smartsection/category.php?categoryid=81 (last visited Feb. 4, 2012), her
criticisms are instructive.
158. Auton, [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 672–74; Factum of the Intervenor Michelle Dawson, 
supra note 157, ¶¶ 4–5, 12. 
159. Factum of the Intervenor Michelle Dawson, supra note 157, ¶¶ 4–5, 12
(rejecting facts provided by both parties). 
160. Auton, [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 673. 
161. Id. at 664. 
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It must be underlined that autism is not a disease. . . . [nor is it] a mental 
illness. . . .
 . . . . 
Autistic people, like non-autistics, sometimes develop serious physical 
diseases, and sometimes suffer from mental illness. . . .
 . . . . 
No allowance is made by either the parties[] or the Courts below that
“untreated” autistic traits, which result in atypical learning and intelligence, 
have great benefit both to autistics and to society. The inherent strengths of
autistics, based on measurable differences in cognition (perception, attention,
memory; and kind, not level, of intelligence) are unavailable to non-autistics,
and according to the principles of ABA as well as its practice, are unavailable to
treated autistics.
 . . . . 
. . . In contrast to the doom painted by the parties for all untreated autistics, 
autistics are in the workforce, they are in academe, they are parents (often of
autistic children), they are artists, architects, engineers, physicists, musicians,
and writers.  Many have, through the brilliance, innovation, impartiality, persistence, 
and courage with which they are gifted, disproportionately contributed to the 
progress and enlightenment of society.162 
Ms. Dawson then challenges ABA treatment on several grounds. 
First, she argues that it is unethical.163  Like homosexuality and left-
handedness, autism brings with it behaviors considered “odd” or 
“inappropriate” by many, but they are variations integral to the person.164 
By forcing individuals to “lose their autistic nature and traits, and 
become, or appear to become, indistinguishable from non-autistic 
[people],”165 ABA seeks to extinguish these variations.  Attempting to
“treat” autism through ABA is therefore as wrongheaded as trying to 
prevent or cure homosexuality—a feat that Dr. Lovaas, himself, attempted 
to do years earlier through ABA—or left-handedness.166  Even if it were
possible to disentangle certain especially troublesome characteristics
from exceptional autistic abilities for purposes of treatment, Dawson
questions whether the purported benefits would outweigh the burdens to 
the child.167  “[M]any ‘normal’ behaviours may be painful, frightening,
or useless to an autistic (i.e. eye contact),” Dawson argues, while
162. Factum of the Intervenor Michelle Dawson, supra note 157, ¶¶ 18, 20, 27, 29. 
163. Id. ¶¶ 33–35. 
164. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
165. Id. ¶ 4. 
166. See id. ¶¶ 50–51. 
167. See id. ¶ 35. 
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“engag[ing] in repetitive behaviour such as arranging objects into neat
rows or flapping their hands in front of their eyes”168 may be
comforting—a coping strategy mounted by the autistic mind.169 
Second, Dawson argues that ABA reinforces negative stereotypes and 
prejudices by depicting “untreated” autistic people as nonproductive and 
in need of cure.170  Quoting the decision of the lower court, Dawson
states that “[t]he basic premise of the parties is that without ‘effective 
treatment, . . . almost all autistic children are doomed to a life of
physical, emotional, social, and intellectual isolation and eventual
institutionalization—a tragic outcome for the children, their families,
and society.’”171  Dawson counters that successful “untreated” autistic 
people are not “freakish oddities”; instead, they are everywhere—living 
lives filled with “learning, intelligence, achievement, innovation, and 
autonomy, however atypically,” and “contribut[ing] greatly to society.”172 
By seeking to make autistic children indistinguishable from the normal
majority, ABA is a constant reminder that “an autistic individual’s 
behaviour, interests and concerns are unacceptable to the majority” and 
that “autistic individuals can only be fulfilled (and in fact can only be 
‘human’) if they are moulded to meet society’s expectation of what is
‘normal.’”173 
Third, Dawson stresses the lack of autonomy implicit in the provision 
of ABA.174  Because children do not have the capacity to consent to 
ABA, the decision to receive the therapy falls to parents and their “all
too human mixture of emotions and motives,”175 often in consultation
with advocacy organizations that consistently deny the participation of 
168. See id. ¶¶ 28, 35 (quoting Auton v. British Columbia, [2000] 78 B.C.L.R. 3d
55, 231 (Can. B.C.)). 
169. Id. ¶¶ 28, 35; see also  NADESAN, supra note 43, at 192 (discussing ABA’s 
“tendency to pathologize many characteristically ‘autistic’ behaviors (such as ‘stimming’
and hand-flapping . . . )”); Ron Amundson, Against Normal Function, 31 STUD. HIST. & 
PHIL. BIOLOGICAL & BIOMED. SCI. 33, 50 (2000) (“[S]timming is often functionally
beneficial to people with autism.  It reduces the chaos they experience, chaos created by
their heightened sensory sensitivity in ‘normal’ environments, and allows them to 
concentrate on particular features of the environment . . . . A non-stimming autistic person
may be more cosmetically normal, but able to function only at a lower level.”); Hacking,
supra note 2, at 55 (noting that although “ordinary people” may regard autistic hand-
flapping as “some kind of agitation, . . . [a]rticulate autists tell us how calming it is”).
170. Factum of the Intervenor Michelle Dawson, supra note 157, ¶¶ 4, 5, 13. 
171. Id. (quoting Auton, [2000] 78 B.C.L.R. 3d at 230). 
172. Id. ¶¶ 30, 36. 
173. Id. ¶¶ 40, 44; see also Therapies and Health Care, supra note 157 (opposing
“the use of behavioral programs that focus on normalization rather than teaching useful
skills”).
174. Factum of the Intervenor Michelle Dawson, supra note 157, ¶ 45. 
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autistics in their governance structures.176  Furthermore, she states, 
“[a]utistics have had no part in any research design or treatment
decisions in ABA programs.  All such roles have been taken by parents, 
governments and service providers.”177 
Lastly, Dawson argues that by envisioning autism as a disorder to be
eradicated rather than a difference to be accommodated, ABA ignores
society’s obligation to fine-tune its structures and assumptions to allow 
for the meaningful participation of autistic people.178  According to 
Dawson, society does not require deaf people to obtain treatment— 
cochlear implants—to make them nondeaf; “train them to act like non-
deaf persons”; or tell them that if they do not strive to become nondeaf, 
they cannot participate in society.179  Rather, society accommodates them, 
for example, through sign-language interpreters.180  According to Dawson,
ABA does not accommodate autistic differences—it disregards them,
“teach[ing] autistics to be ‘normal’ such that they can participate in 
society by passing as non-autistic.”181 
IV. CONSTRUCTING DISABILITY: THE MEDICAL VS. SOCIAL MODELS 
The autism debate appears to fit neatly within the broader debate 
between the social model of disability, which holds that disability is 
socially constructed, and the medical model, which holds that it is not. 
However, although disability’s dueling models explain parents’ and the 
neurodiversity movement’s disagreement over what causes disability, 
they do not fully explain the autism debate.  To understand why, it is 
first necessary to look at the concept of “social construction.” 
A.  Social Construction Generally 
As philosopher Ian Hacking notes, the phrase social construction is 
“both obscure and overused. . . .  [It] has become code.  If you use it 
favorably, you deem yourself rather radical.  If you trash the phrase, you
declare that you are rational, reasonable, and respectable.”182  Clearing 
176. Id. ¶ 61. 
177. Id. ¶ 34. 
178. Id. ¶¶ 37–39. 
179. Id. ¶ 58. 
180. See id. 
181. Id. ¶ 61. 

























   
away the underbrush, social construction accounts are, at bottom, about
consciousness-raising, about unmasking assumptions, and, most of all, 
about hope.183  Things are not fixed or inevitable but instead “the product of
historical events, social forces, and ideology”; they can be changed.184  And 
not only can things change, but we, as a society, can change them.
Social constructionist accounts are everywhere.  Race and gender, 
rocks and genes—all are said to be socially constructed.185 According to 
Hacking, socially constructed things tend to share two important features: 
(1) the thing that is said to be constructed is taken for granted—it 
“appears to be inevitable”; and (2) the thing “need not have existed, or 
need not be at all as it is.”186  It is “not determined by the nature of
things; it is not inevitable.”187  Rather, it is contingent.188  Importantly,
there are various grades of commitment to social construction, ranging
from the noncommittal (the thing is contingent, the upshot of historical 
events) to the rebellious and revolutionary (the contingent thing is bad
and should be done away with).189 
B.  The Social and Medical Models of Disability 
Disability scholarship identifies two primary models of disability: the 
social model and the medical model.190  Under both models, the word
disability means some limitation on ability, some disadvantage.191  The 
primary distinction between the two models is the source of that 
disadvantage—the cause of disability.192 
1. Medical Model 
According to the medical model, disability is inevitable and is caused 
by an impairment that limits bodily functioning.193  Disability is
183. See id. at 6–7. 
184. Id. at 2. 
185. Id. at 1, 21–22. 
186. Id. at 6, 12. 
187. Id. at 6. 
188. Id. at 12. 
189. Id. at 19–20. 
190. See, e.g., BAGENSTOS, supra note 4, at 18. 
 191. Barry, supra note 12, at 210; see also Samaha, supra note 18, at 1255–56 
(“Stripped down to basics, the [social] model moves causal responsibility for
disadvantage from physically and mentally impaired individuals to their architectural,
social, and economic environment. . . .  [The ‘medical model’] focuses on the disadvantaging
impact of physical or mental impairments rather than that of the environment in which
they operate.”).
192. See Samaha, supra note 18, at 1255–56. 
193. See, e.g., BAGENSTOS, supra note 4, at 18; see also  OLIVER, supra note 10, at 
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not every impairment—just those that impose limitations that rise to a
certain “disabling” level.  The medical model may be expressed as follows: 
Disability = impairment + profound functional limitations. 
Consider a man with depression.  According to the medical model, he 
is disabled if his depression imposes profound functional limitations.
Maybe there are days when he cannot stop crying, cannot bear the 
thought of getting out of bed, does not want to eat, feels worthless.194  If
his depression is so severe that he cannot perform life functions, then he 
is disabled; he has a disability. 
A woman with psoriasis—a skin condition—has an impairment too. 
She is probably not disabled, though, unless that condition imposes 
functional limitations, such as psoriatic arthritis, which may limit her 
ability to bend or perform certain tasks with her hands.  Otherwise, she 
goes about her day—working, sleeping, eating.  Does she have an
impairment? Yes.  Does the impairment disable her?  Of course not. 
As several commentators have noted, “Descriptions of the medical
model often include a subordination theme as well. . . .  [C]ritics of the 
medical model associate it with belittling norms that relieve impaired
persons from social obligations yet demand they abide by professional
medical judgment.  Both responsibility and liberty are thereby reduced.”195 
By treating disability “as a medical condition or functional deficit, it is 
readily seen as a ‘personal tragedy—some terrible chance event which 
occurs at random to unfortunate individuals.’”196  The medical model
“encourages dependence on doctors, rehabilitation professionals,
and charity”; “stigmatize[s] people with disabilities by defining them as 
something less than normal”; and “obscure[s] the social practices that 
exclude ‘the disabled’ from the opportunity to participate fully in
society.”197 
tragedy,” which “load[s] responsibility for the restrictions that disabled people 
experience on to disabled people themselves, who are restricted because of the functional
or psychological limitations imposed by their individual impairments rather than by the 
social restrictions imposed by society”).
194. See DSM-IV, supra note 3, at 327 (listing criteria for “Major Depressive
Episode”).
 195. Samaha, supra note 18, at 1256–57 (footnote omitted). 
 196. BAGENSTOS, supra note 4, at 18 (quoting OLIVER, supra note 7, at 32). 
197. Id. at 6–7, 18; see also Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 621, 649–51 (1999) (discussing medical model’s treatment of disability










   
 






      
 








But the medical model need not go so far.  At bottom, the medical 
model is simply a story of causation: impairment’s functional limitations 
cause disability. 
2. Social Model 
Rather than taking disability for granted as an impairment that
inevitably afflicts some people and limits their functioning, the social
model holds that disability is socially constructed.198  Although impairments
may be inevitable, disability is contingent.199  Disability is the interaction 
between a person’s impairment and the person’s environment—it is the 
negative treatment that a person experiences based on the person’s
impairment.200  This model may be expressed as follows: 
Disability = impairment + environment (negative treatment). 
There are several variations of the social model.  One might say that 
any negative treatment based on impairment is disabling.  This is the 
universal approach: we all have impairments,201 and those of us who are
negatively treated because of those impairments are disabled.202 
A narrower approach to the social model says that the negative 
treatment cannot be an occasional affair—it must result in systematic
grant[s] the medical profession cognitive authority to identify and treat disabled
persons”); David Pfeiffer, The Conceptualization of Disability, in 2 RESEARCH IN SOCIAL 
SCIENCE AND DISABILITY, supra note 7, at 29, 30 (discussing medical model’s view of
people as “being in the sick role, or as being sick,” and requiring that they “follow the 
orders of the professional . . . in order to become ‘well’”). 
198. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 4, at 19 (stating that social model “treats human
differences as constructed by, and residing in, social relationships”). 
199. See id. at 18; see also  OLIVER, supra note 10, at 70 (noting that while
“impairment is ‘real,’” disadvantage based on impairment is “neither natural nor 
inevitable”).
200. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 4, at 18. 
 201. Shakespeare & Watson, supra note 7, at 24 (“No-one’s body works perfectly, 
or consistently, or eternally.  We are all in some way impaired.”).
 202. Barry, supra note 12, at 217–18.  One might argue that the social model of 
disability is even more universal than this.  One might say that the social model of 
disability does not require an actual or perceived impairment at all and instead applies to 
anyone treated negatively based on any trait or characteristic.  Although this is an
attractive reading of the social model, it is not a prevailing one. See Shelley Tremain, 
On the Government of Disability: Foucault, Power, and the Subject of Impairment, in
THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER, supra note 7, at 185, 191 (Lennard J. Davis ed., 2d ed. 
2006) (“[A]n unstated premise of the [social] model is . . . [that] impairment is a 
necessary condition for disability.  For proponents of the model do not argue that people 
who are excluded, or discriminated against, on the basis of (say) skin color are by virtue 
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disadvantage, namely, prejudice, stereotypes, and neglect.203  Because
systematic disadvantage generally applies only to those impairments that
are stigmatized—those considered not normal—only people with
stigmatized impairments are disabled.  This is the “minority group
approach” to the social model.204 
No matter what the approach, under the social model, it is society’s
negative treatment of individuals based on their impairments—not the 
impairments themselves—that disables.205  In fact, one need not even 
have an actual impairment to be disabled: one may be disabled as a result
of a perceived impairment—for example, a person who is perceived as
having HIV and discriminated against on that basis.206  Under the social 
model, the impairment is not the problem that results in disadvantage— 
207 we are. 
Consider again the man with depression.  He has an impairment, and 
the social model acknowledges that.  He may also have functional
limitations associated with the impairment, and the social model
acknowledges that too.  But under the social model, those functional 
limitations do not disable him.  He is disabled only if society treats him 
negatively based on his impairment.208  And society often does—he may 
not get hired for a job if the employer finds out about his depression.209 
His friends and family may think of his depression as a liability— 
something that may rub off on them—and decide to limit the time they 
spend with him.210  On the other hand, he may not be disabled by
203. See Barry, supra note 12, at 213–14; see also Shakespeare & Watson, supra
note 7, at 25 (“[W]hile all living beings are impaired—that is, frail, limited, vulnerable, 
mortals—we are not all oppressed on the basis of this impairment and illness.  Only a 
proportion of people experience the additional disabling processes of society.  Put
another way, societies have evolved to minimise the problems of the majority of people 
with impairment, but have failed to deal effectively with the problems of a minority of
people with impairment.”). 
 204. Barry, supra note 12, at 213–14 (citing Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, 
Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 422, 436–37, 479 (2000)). 
205. See id. at 212. 
206. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Gen. Elec. Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 824, 
827–28 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (involving harassment of employee who was erroneously
perceived as having HIV). 
 207. Barry, supra note 12, at 212. 
208. Id. at 212–13. 
209. Cf. McMullin v. Ashcroft, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1299 (D. Wyo. 2004) 
(upholding employer’s termination of court security officer because of history of
depression and use of antidepressant medication). 
210. See Elizabeth F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness, 


























his depression.  Maybe he has an employer who understands that he may
need to work remotely from home some days.  Maybe he has friends and 
family who support him through those hard times.  In this way, even a 
person whose depression imposes clinically significant functional 
limitations may not be disabled under the social model.211 
The converse is also true.  Take the person with psoriasis.  She may
have no functional limitations.  But if she is denied a job because
someone spots an odd rash along her hairline,212 she is disabled—regardless
of the lack of any functional limitation. 
There is one complication to the social model that is worth noting.  As
described above, the social model views disability as the negative 
treatment of impairment.  Because the medical model is often understood to
include not only a causation account of disability but also the negative 
treatment that flows from that account—stigma, dependence, and lack of
regard for societal barriers213—the social model might easily be conflated 
with the medical model.  In other words, the medical model’s view of 
disability as a deficit in personal functioning, and the societal barriers— 
attitudinal and otherwise—that flow from it, might be considered disabling 
under the social model.214  Taken to its logical extent, this reading of the
social model reduces the medical model to a straw man—a mere
descriptor of what disables under the social model.  The social model
need not go so far. 
Although those who favor the social model might say that the medical 
model is, itself, disabling and therefore always wrong,215 they can do so
without undermining the theoretical legitimacy of the medical model’s
central premise, which is that disability is caused by functional limitations, 
not societal ones. 
psychologists call “emotional contagion,” by which “one person unconsciously absorbs 
or ‘catches’ the particular mood or emotion of another”).
211. Although this example is useful for purposes of comparison between the 
medical and social models, it assumes that individuals with depression do not experience 
negative treatment in any other aspect of their lives.  This is probably not the case. 
Notwithstanding supportive employers, family, and friends, individuals with depression 
are probably still “disabled” by negative treatment elsewhere in their lives. See id. at
401 (discussing widespread discrimination against people with mental illness). 
212. Cf. Tosha Rests., LLC v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 911 N.Y.S.2d 734, 
738 (App. Div. 2010) (involving termination of dishwasher because of psoriasis and 
cellulitis affecting the back of his head).
213. See supra notes 195–97 and accompanying text. 
214. The converse is not true: the social model’s view of disability as the interaction
between impairment and environment does not give rise to disability under the medical
model. 
215. Cf. Samaha, supra note 18, at 1257 (“It is difficult to find scholars who 
promote [the medical] model of disability. . . .  [D]isability studies scholars hold out the 
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C.  Similarities 
Beyond their causation stories, the social and medical models have
much in common.  First, both models regard disability as a limitation on
ability—a disadvantage—and therefore something to be gotten rid of.216 
Although the medical model locates that disadvantage within the person, 
and the social model locates that disadvantage in the interaction between
the person and the environment, both agree that the world would be a 
better place without disability. 
Second, as a general matter, both models acknowledge the inevitability of
impairment and its centrality to the disability equation.217  Under the 
medical model of disability, only impairments that limit functioning give 
rise to disability.  Under the social model, only impairments that are
negatively treated give rise to disability, whether or not they limit
functioning.  Both models therefore leave the inevitability of impairment
undisturbed, safe and sound in the annals of science, and instead clash
over the contingency of disability.218  The medical model holds that
disability is a deficit in bodily functioning that inevitably results from 
impairment, while the social model holds that disability is negative 
216. See, e.g., BAGENSTOS, supra note 4, at 7 (contrasting those who seek to 
eliminate disability “through the medical means of eliminating impairments” and those
who seek to “eliminate the social and physical structures that create ‘disability’ by
denying opportunities to people with some impairments”). 
217. See, e.g., Samaha, supra note 18, at 1257–58 (discussing medical model’s 
focus on the “disadvantaging” impact of physical or mental impairments and the social 
model’s focus on the “disadvantage caused by the confluence of (1) personal impairment 
and (2) a social setting”); BAGENSTOS, supra note 4, at 18–19 (contrasting social model’s 
treatment of disability “as the interaction between societal barriers . . . and the impairment”
and medical model’s treatment of disability “as an inherent personal characteristic”).
218. See Areheart, supra note 18, at 354 (“[T]he social model—by relying on a 
binary division between social disablement and physiological impairment—unwittingly
underscores the notion that disability has a biological essence. . . .  [A]lthough the social 
model was formulated to indicate disability’s constructed nature, it inadvertently reifies 
the idea that disability is built in part upon non-social, biological, and essential facts.”);
see also Mairian Corker & Sally French, Reclaiming Discourse in Disability Studies, in
DISABILITY DISCOURSE, supra note 134, at 1, 2 (“Social model theory rests on the 
distinction between disability, which is socially created, and impairment, which is referred to
as a physical attribute of the body.”); Osteen, supra note 144, at 3 (“[D]isability studies 
[have] been unwilling or unable to theorize impairment, suffering and pain . . . perhaps 
because doing so would seem to yield the floor to medicine. . . .  [D]isability scholars too 
often present impairment as a ‘fixed surface onto which disability is “projected” by
culture,’ abandoning impairment to the clinical fields.” (quoting Corker & French, supra, 
at 3)); Tremain, supra note 202, at 187 (“[T]he impairment-disability distinction . . . 
renders the impaired body the exclusive jurisdiction of medical interpretation.”). 
199
 
   
  
   
 


































treatment based on impairment and is contingent. By assuming the 
inevitability of impairment, both models sidestep a crucial question: are
impairments themselves inevitable, or are they, too, socially constructed?219 
Part V will address this difficult question. 
Third, neither model requires a particular remedy.220  As Professor 
Samaha notes, “Deciding how to respond to ‘disability’ depends on a
normative framework that cannot be supplied by the [social] model.”221 
The same might also be said for the medical model.  Moral frameworks— 
be they “libertarian, utilitarian, egalitarian, some combination thereof, or 
something else”—determine policy,222 not the medical and social models
themselves.
The social model, which conceives of disability as being “brought into 
existence or shaped by social events, forces, [and] history,”223 is generally
understood as favoring civil rights interventions over medical ones.224  If
society is causing the problem, the argument goes, then society ought to 
remedy it through accommodations, antidiscrimination, and so on. 
Removing disability, the reasoning goes, lies not in cures, charity, and 
social welfare interventions but rather in access.225  Although civil rights
remedies are certainly consistent with the social model, they are not
necessitated by it.226  The social model—at least, a more noncommittal
version of it—does not demand a particular policy response or any 
response at all.227  One might acknowledge that society’s neglect of
219. See Areheart, supra note 18, at 360–62. 
220. See Samaha, supra note 18, at 1275 (arguing that while social model explains 
cause of disability—combination of impairment and social setting—it does not determine 
appropriate policy response, which is instead “a matter of contested norms”). 
221. Id. at 1252–53. 
222. Id. at 1253. 
223. See HACKING, supra note 19, at 7.
 224. BAGENSTOS, supra note 4, at 18. 
225. Id. at 20 (“[M]ost disability rights activists insist that society as a whole has a 
responsibility to eliminate the social and physical structures that deny people with
‘disabilities’ access to opportunities—the structures that, in a significant way, create
‘disability.’”).
 226. Samaha, supra note 18, at 1308 (arguing that “[t]he social model of disability
is not a justification for any policy goal,” be it social restructuring or individualized medical 
care).
227. Id.  Ian Hacking traces the various grades of commitment of social 
construction, from those accounts that hold that something is contingent to those that 
“move[] beyond the world of ideas and tr[y] to change the world.”  HACKING, supra note 
19, at 19–20.  The social model of disability, which was developed by the disability
rights movement to challenge the dominant medical model of disability, falls into the
latter camp.  See Samaha, supra note 18, at 1280–82.  In order to move beyond “the
world of ideas” to concrete policy responses that “change the world,” however, the social 
model requires a normative framework, and that framework may yield a variety of policy
responses or no response at all.  See id. at 1253–54, 1280 (“[N]o policy response is 
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people with various impairments is to blame for disability, but that the 
remedy—at least for now—should include continued cash benefits and
charity.228  One might further acknowledge that rehabilitation and research 
into cures are also not antithetical to eliminating disability on grounds
that, if there is no underlying impairment, there will be no negative
treatment.229  Favoring policy responses outside the realm of civil rights
is not abandonment of the social model because the social model has
little to say about policy.
Conversely, although the medical model is generally associated with 
“using medical technology to cure existing disability or prevent future 
disability, and . . . us[ing] rehabilitative techniques to help disabled
individuals approximate dominant physical standards as closely as
possible,”230 medical treatment and social welfare interventions are not 
proprietary to the medical model.  One who views disability as a personal 
problem of solely medical origin may favor accommodation over cure
because the former is a surer bet.  Schizophrenia has been around for a 
century and there is still no cure, one might argue, so why not support 
laws that take aim at stigma?231 
Given these similarities, the dividing line between the medical and 
social models is not as stark as it is often made out to be.  Cures and 
treatments for impairments may seem a natural fit for the medical
model—but the social model does not forbid the same.232  In fact, neither
model of disability has much to say about policy choices.  And both 
models acknowledge that impairment is inevitable and that the world 
would be a better place without disability.233  What differences remain, 
then, lie in the models’ causation stories—the medical model’s emphasis 
228. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 4, at 25, 149 (stating that social welfare remedies
such as cash and in-kind benefits are not necessarily at odds with disability rights 
activists’ goal of independence, and noting that civil rights remedies such as the ADA’s 
reasonable accommodation mandate “might readily [be] chacterize[d] . . . as a request for 
charity”).
 229. See OLIVER, supra note 10, at 48 (“Some [medical] involvements are, of
course, entirely appropriate, as in the diagnosis of impairment, the stabilisation of 
medical condition after trauma, the treatment of illness occurring independent of 
disability and the provision of physical rehabilitation.”); see also Samaha, supra note 18, 
at 1277 (arguing that, with respect to deafness, the social model would not prohibit 
policy responses ranging from do-nothing, to subsidized access to cochlear implants and
genetic screening, to expansion of ASL instruction and sign language communities).
 230. Crossley, supra note 197, at 652 (citation omitted).
231. See GRINKER, supra note 20, at 120–21. 
232. See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 





    
 













on impairment as the cause of disability versus the social model’s 
emphasis on the interaction between impairment and environment.234  
D.  Autism and Disability 
The medical-versus-social model binary helps to explain part of the 
autism debate, but not the whole.  Parents and the neurodiverse disagree 
about the causation of disability.  The former view disability as inevitable—
it is caused by the functional limitations that flow inevitably from 
autism.  This is the medical model.235 The latter view disability as socially
constructed—it is caused by societal barriers that are contingent.  This is 
the social model.236  But beyond that, the medical-versus-social model
binary fails to distinguish between autism’s sides. 
First, under both models, disability is a disadvantage—a negative
medical state or negative societal treatment—and therefore something 
that ought to be gotten rid of.237  Far from distinguishing the two sides in
the autism debate, the medical-versus-social model binary suggests that 
both parents and the neurodiverse seek the same thing: an end to
disability, albeit through very different means.
Second, disability’s medical-versus-social model binary has no policy
implications—it does not explain parents’ and the neurodiverse’s 
disagreement over how to get rid of disability.238  Parents suggest a range of
ways: from mainstream medical research that might lead to 
pharmacological treatments, cures, and prevention to fundraising messages 
that support treatment, cures, and prevention; from applied behavioral 
analysis that seeks to modify autistic behavior to try-anything, kitchen-
sink approaches to treating autism that are dubious and even deadly. 
The neurodiverse are generally critical of such measures, which they
regard as unethical, stigmatizing, and inconsistent with autistic autonomy.
Instead, they point to, among other things, support services and other 
structural changes that help autistic people better navigate an NT world.239 
Although disability’s medical-versus-social model binary explains 
dueling conceptions of the causation of disability, it has little to do with 
how (or if) that disability is remedied.240  As Professor Samaha points
out, moral frameworks—not models of causation—govern policy responses 
234. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
235. See supra notes 193–97 and accompanying text. 
236. See supra notes 198–215 and accompanying text. 
237. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
238. See supra notes 220–31 and accompanying text. 
239. See supra Part III.B. 
240. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
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to disability.241 As a result, the medical-versus-social model binary does
not distinguish parents’ choice of cures, treatment, and prevention from 
accommodations and other aims of the neurodiverse. 
Finally, although disability’s medical-versus-social model binary 
describes the debate over the social construction of disability, it takes for 
granted the inevitability of impairment.242  It is therefore inadequate
because impairment, like disability, may also be socially constructed.  As
discussed in the next Part, it is the social construction of impairment—not 
disability—that meaningfully distinguishes autism’s sides. 
V. CONSTRUCTING IMPAIRMENT: PATHOLOGY VS. EXPERIENCE
Disability’s medical-versus-social model binary does not explain the 
autism debate between parents who say that autism ought to be defeated
and the neurodiverse who say it ought to be respected.  But if disability 
does not distinguish the two sides in the debate, then what are they
fighting about?  The answer is that they are not fighting about disability
at all—they are fighting about impairment.  They are fighting about autism.
According to many parents of autistic children, autism is a—as of yet 
undiscovered—biological pathology.243  The neurodiversity movement
says, “No, that’s not what autism is, or that’s not all that autism is.
There is something else—there is the experience of having autism, of 
being autistic.”244  Here, the debate shifts from the social construction of
disability and whether disability is contingent (social model) or inevitable 
(medical model) to the construction of impairment.245 According to the
neurodiversity movement, autism is itself socially constructed and 
therefore contingent, not inevitable.246 
241. See supra notes 221–22 and accompanying text. 
242. See supra notes 217–19 and accompanying text. 
243. See supra notes 38, 41 and accompanying text. 
244. See supra notes 37, 40 and accompanying text. 
245. See supra notes 217–19 and accompanying text. 


















   











   




A.  Beyond Diagnosis
Recent work in disability studies has chronicled how impairment is 
socially constructed.247  As Professor Bradley Areheart has noted, 
impairment is principally identified and described through the practice
of medical diagnosis.248  Medical diagnosis, he rightly argues, is a social
concept in at least two ways.249  The first involves the creation of the
diagnosis itself—the historical and political factors leading to the existence 
or “naming” of an impairment.250  For example, protests by gay activists
and “the shifting fortunes of various powerful factions within the American 
Psychiatric Association” led to the elimination of homosexuality as a 
mental impairment.251  Likewise, the naming of deafness, blindness, and 
mental retardation are social judgments involving line-drawing.252  The 
creation or deletion of these impairments was not inevitable—it was the
product of clinicians’, advocates’, and others’ deciding what is “normal” 
and what is named.253 
247. See Areheart, supra note 18, at 349 (arguing that “impairment, though 
theorized as biologically asocial, is indeed a social concept”); see also Samaha, supra
note 18, at 1266 (noting that, according to some commentators, “‘impairment’ is itself a 
socially ascribed characteristic, an outgrowth of practices that demand the identification 
of difference,” and that it is “politically naive to suggest that the term ‘impairment’ is
value-neutral, . . . as if there could ever be a description that was not also a prescription
for the formulation of the object” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Shelley 
Tremain, On the Government of Disability, 27 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 617, 621 (2001))). 
 248. Areheart, supra note 18, at 362; see also KUTCHINS & KIRK, supra note 16, at 
27 (discussing DSM’s role in defining mental disorders). 
 249. Areheart, supra note 18, at 363; see also KUTCHINS & KIRK, supra note 16, at 
27–28, 52–53 (discussing arbitrariness inherent in DSM’s definition of mental disorders 
and inability of clinicians to reliably diagnose mental disorders). 
250. See Areheart, supra note 18, at 363. 
 251. KUTCHINS & KIRK, supra note 16, at 37, 55–56 (“The dispute over the 
inclusion of homosexuality in DSM was not about research findings.  It was a 20-year 
debate about beliefs and values.  Although the professionals who formulated diagnoses
couched their arguments in the language of science, the actual influence of empirical
data was negligible.  More often than not, the issues were settled by political
compromises that promoted personal interests.”).
252. See Areheart, supra note 18, at 367–69; see also Lane, supra note 151, at 177 
(“Research has shown that some children characterized as profoundly hearing impaired 
can understand words and sentences whereas others do not even detect sound.” (citation 
omitted) (citing Mary Joe Osberger & Monica Maso, Speech Intelligibility of Children 
with Cochlear Implants, Tactile Aids, or Hearing Aids, 1 J. SPEECH & HEARING RES. 186, 
203 (1993))).  “Likewise . . . the official definition of blindness is ‘based upon a
meaningless demarcation among those with severely impaired vision.’”  Osberger & 
Maso, supra, at 203 (citation omitted) (quoting ROBERT A. SCOTT, THE MAKING OF 
BLIND MEN 42 (1981)). 
253. See  KUTCHINS & KIRK, supra note 16, at 37 (“[T]he construction of DSM 
involved much more than the assembling of scientific conclusions and the making of 
technical decisions.  It involved negotiations among contending interest groups of
theoreticians, researchers, clinicians, hospitals, clinics, and drug companies—and,
at times, potential patients.”).
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The second way that diagnosis is a social construct involves the act of 
diagnosis—the process by which a person is determined to have an 
impairment.254 For example, a diagnosis of depression relies on a person’s
self-assessment, “which will almost necessarily be informed by social
meanings,” together with a clinician’s interpretation of these subjective
phenomena to yield a diagnosis.255 
Because the creation and acts of diagnosis are fraught with contingency, 
impairment may be said to be socially constructed.256  The social model’s
anchor of “impairment,” one might say, is not a “raw, ‘unadulterated
biological core.’”257  It is contingent.
This is true so far as it goes, but what about the closer cases where 
impairment is diagnosed not through a collection of subjective features
pathologized by clinicians but rather through our blood, our genes, our 
brains, our immune system?  In these types of cases, it seems more
difficult to say that impairment is socially constructed—that it is contingent.  
Results of blood tests, genetic testing, brain imaging, and CT scans seem
awfully inevitable, unaffected by social institutions and practices.258 
I want to suggest another way in which impairment is constructed, one
with implications for all impairments, including the closer cases.
Drawing on the work of philosopher Ian Hacking, I argue that
impairments are constructed, in part, by those classified as having the 
impairments.259  This argument takes us well beyond the semantics of
construction—how impairment is constructed through naming and
254. See Areheart, supra note 18, at 364 (citing CHARLES E. ROSENBERG & JANET 
GOLDEN, FRAMING DISEASE: STUDIES IN CULTURAL HISTORY, at xiii (1992)). 
255. Id. at 371; see also Bernstein, supra note 16 (contrasting diagnosis of mental 
disorders with “scientifically more mature (some would say less difficult) areas of 
medicine where diseases are identified by more ‘objectively’ ascertainable abnormalities 
of anatomy, physiology, or biochemistry and where genetic and environmental etiologies 
are increasingly certain”).
256. See Areheart, supra note 18, at 362. 
257. Id. at 363 (quoting ROBERT A. ARONOWITZ, MAKING SENSE OF ILLNESS: 
SCIENCE, SOCIETY, AND DISEASE 171 (1998)). 
258. One might nevertheless argue that these purportedly objective scientific measures
of “impairment,” themselves, construct, as opposed to merely describe, “impairment.” 
See Tremain, supra note 202, at 188, 192 (arguing that “allegedly ‘real’ impairments” 
are “an effect of certain historical conditions and contingent relations of social power”). 
According to Professor Ron Amundson, “[T]he doctrine of biological normality is itself 
one aspect of a social prejudice against certain functional modes or styles.  The 
disadvantage experienced by people who are assessed as ‘abnormal’ derive not from 
biology, but from implicit social judgments about the acceptability of certain kinds of 
biological variation.”  Amundson, supra note 169, at 33. 






     
 
 
    
 
 
   
   









diagnosis.  This argument focuses instead on the dynamics of 
construction—how impairments (once named and diagnosed) affect, and 
in turn are affected by, those who are named.260 
As Professor Hacking states, “One of the defects of social construction 
talk is that it suggests a one-way street: society (or some fragment of it) 
constructs the [impairment] (and that is a bad thing because the
[impairment] does not really exist as described, or would not really exist 
unless so described).”261  My argument suggests “a two-way street” by 
which the meaning of impairment changes, and is changed by, those
classified.262 
B.  Ideas and Objects
In arguing that impairment is socially constructed by those classified 
by it, an important distinction must be made.  When we say that something
is socially constructed (contingent), it is not always clear what that
something is.  According to Professor Hacking, things that are said to be
socially constructed include both “objects” in the world, broadly
speaking—people or material things—and “ideas” about those objects— 
classifications, kinds, categories, concepts, beliefs, and attitudes.263 This
distinction matters; the answer to the question of whether something— 
such as impairment—is constructed depends on it.  Therefore, it is 
necessary to distinguish between the “idea” of impairment and its
referent, the “object” to which that idea refers.
1. Ideas 
First consider ideas about objects.  These ideas—take classifications 
(ideas) of people (objects), for instance—do not exist in a vacuum, in
solely the “empty space of language.”264  Instead, they are formed within 
a social setting, a “matrix” of institutions and practices.265  This matrix
in which ideas are formed is a mosaic; it is a complex of everything from 
laws, lawyers, court decisions, social workers, advocates, and newspaper 
articles to doctors’ offices, schools, health insurance, and fundraisers.266 
Ideas are not inevitable—they are the product of social practices and
institutions and are therefore socially constructed. 
260. Id. at 123. 
261. Id. at 116. 
262. See id.
263. Id. at 22. 
264. Id. at 10, 31. 
265. Id. at 10. 
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As noted above, the classification disability or disabled person might
be said to be socially constructed—it came about as a result of the 
disadvantage experienced by people with certain physical or mental
impairments.267  As Professor Hacking notes, the classification woman 
refugee is likewise constructed—it came about as a result of social 
events that led women to leave their homes under threat of violence and
includes the laws that recognize these events as grounds for not returning 
women to their homelands.268  Similarly, the classification child TV 
viewer came about as a result of concerns expressed by researchers over the
ills of obesity, poor socialization, and violence attributed to children
watching television.269  And the classification child abuse emerged in
the 1950s when radiologists and pediatricians “decried the evidence
they were seeing of parents beating their children,” and when society
responded by passing laws forbidding it, hiring social workers to
investigate it, requiring schoolteachers to report it, and appropriating 
funds to study and raise awareness about it.270 
None of these classifications was inevitable.  As for disability, 
sidewalks never had to be built without curb cuts; schools never had to
deem certain children uneducable; employers never had to refuse to hire 
certain people based on medical histories; and the medical establishment
never had to institutionalize certain people.  For women refugees, 
countries could have made any person crossing their borders a citizen
with no questions asked, could have found some other way to protect 
women fleeing their homelands, or could have immediately returned 
them to their country of origin.271  With respect to child TV viewers, 
researchers could have overlooked TV as a potential culprit for obesity,
poor socialization, and violence, or parents could have ignored the 
purported threat to their children altogether.272  And as for child abuse, 
pediatricians need never have called attention to unreported healed
fractures in the legs and arms of children, and society could have continued
to focus on other children’s issues, such as child poverty, infant mortality, 
child labor, and juvenile delinquency.273  The classifications disability, 
267. See supra notes 205–11 and accompanying text. 
268. See Hacking, supra note 2, at 10–11 (emphasis omitted). 
269. Id. at 26. 
 270. Lane, supra note 151, at 172. 
271. See HACKING, supra note 19, at 11. 
272. See id. at 26–27. 










   
   
 
    
 
   
  









    
 
women refugees, child TV viewer, and child abuse, and the matrix of 
institutions and social practices surrounding them, never had to be, or 
never had to be quite as they are.  In this way, these classifications of
people—these ideas about objects—can be said to be socially constructed. 
The same might even be said, albeit with more difficulty, of
classifications of things other than people.  Consider the quark—a
fundamental particle of matter.  Professor Hacking suggests that a social 
construction account of the classification quark need not deny the
existence of fundamental particles of matter.274  Instead, it would argue
that the idea or concept of the quark was not inevitable—that “the
evolution of physics, including the quark idea, is thoroughly contingent 
and could have evolved in other ways.”275  An equally successful physics
could have proceeded in a nonquarky way with “different successes 
evolving in other ways that do not converge on the route that was in fact
taken.”276  The same might also be said for ponies and plutonium: the
former might have been classified as a “horse” and the latter, an artificial
element, might never have been created at all. 
Impairments can be thought of in much the same way. When
commentators say that impairments are constructed, they are arguing 
that classifications such as MR and learning disability  (impairment X) 
never had to be.277  The classification impairment X was formed 
within a social setting where certain characteristics were pathologized
(named) and applied to people (diagnosed).278  Clinicians need not have 
named certain characteristics; or they need not have diagnosed people as 
they did.  As commentators have noted, “[S]ocial forces affect the
conceptualisation, recognition and visibility of disorders.  A disorder in 
one place and at one time is not seen as such in another.”279  The  
classification impairment X is therefore not immune to social events;
instead, it is the upshot of those events—the convergence of clinicians, 
274. See id. at 70. 
275. See id. at 31. 
276. Id. at 32–33, 70. 
277. See supra notes 247–57 and accompanying text. 
278. See id.
 279. OLIVER, supra note 10, at 13 (quoting M.W. SUSSER & W. WATSON, 
SOCIOLOGY IN MEDICINE 35 (2d ed. 1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at
14 (“Beliefs about sickness, the behaviors exhibited by sick persons, and the ways in 
which sick persons are responded to by family and practitioners are all aspects of social
reality.  They . . . are cultural constructions, shaped distinctly in different societies and in 
different social structural settings within those societies.” (quoting ARTHUR KLEINMAN, 
PATIENTS AND HEALERS IN THE CONTEXT OF CULTURE: AN EXPLORATION OF THE 
BORDERLAND BETWEEN ANTHROPOLOGY, MEDICINE, AND PSYCHIATRY 38 (1980))
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advocates, health insurance, drug makers, and others who decide what 
impairment X is.280 
The classification Asperger’s syndrome is a good example of the 
contingency of ideas.  According to the proposed DSM-V, Asperger’s 
will disappear as a diagnosis because of the inexactitude of its current 
criteria, which have been “used loosely with little agreement” among
clinicians.281  But inevitable things do not just disappear—Asperger’s is
disappearing because it is contingent. 
The classification autism is also contingent.  It need never have been 
named: its higher functioning manifestations could have remained mere 
oddities, while its lower functioning manifestations could have continued to
be lumped under childhood schizophrenia or MR.282  Furthermore, far
from disappearing like Asperger’s, autism is expanding under the DSM-V
and swallowing a number of formerly named autistic subtypes along the
way.283  Autism’s appearance on the scene and proposed metamorphosis
under the DSM-V are contingent.
Importantly, the contingency of impairment X does not stop there. 
The matrix in which impairment X derives meaning includes not only
those contingent practices and institutions that name and diagnose
impairment X but all of those other practices and institutions in the
matrix that affect people classified as having impairment X.284  It includes 
those social elements that not only treat people with impairment X but
also educate, legislate, employ, and entertain them.  Therapists and
advocates, laws and lawyers, summer camps, job coaches, and popular
media—all give impairment X its meaning.285  None of these institutions
and practices was inevitable. 
2. Objects 
So classifications of people, and even classifications of things in the
natural world, might be said to be socially constructed.  This is not that 
280. See supra note 253 and accompanying text. 
281. See Asperger’s Disorder: Rationale, supra note 10. 
282. See GRINKER, supra note 20, at 157–59. 
283. See Asperger’s Disorder: Rationale, supra note 10 (listing conditions subsumed by
“autism spectrum disorder”).
284. See supra notes 264–66 and accompanying text. 
285. The ADA, for example, provides antidiscrimination protection only to those 
with an actual or perceived “impairment.”  See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006 & Supp. II 

















   
  
 




controversial.  After all, such classifications are embedded within matrices
that include many obvious social elements.286  Through social practices
and institutions, these classifications are “debated, assessed, applied, and
developed” and “proposed, criticized, entertained, [and] rejected.”287 In 
a word, they are contingent. 
But now to the root of the matter.  What about the things so 
classified—the things to which the classification refers?  The people, the
ponies, the pathologies, themselves.  Might the point be extended— 
might the people or the material objects so classified, themselves, also be
socially constructed?  Or have we at last reached bedrock—those things that
are inevitable, that are fixed?  According to Professor Hacking, the answer 
depends on the thing so classified.288 
a. “Interactive” Kinds: Classifications of People 
Classifications of people are “interactive” kinds of classifications.289 
These classifications interact with—and influence—the people they
classify.290  This is so because people are self-conscious—they are aware 
of what is said about them, thought about them, and done to them.291  As
they move through the matrix of social practices and institutions affecting 
them, “people . . . become aware of how they are classified and modify
their behavior accordingly.”292  The classification, and the matrix within 
which that classification gets communicated, “changes how some
[people] feel about themselves, their experiences, and their actions.”293 
People may think of themselves as fitting within that classification, may
transform the meaning of that classification, or may reject that 
classification altogether.294 Because one is indirectly affected by that
classification, “the individual herself is socially constructed as a certain
kind of person.”295  For interactive kinds of classifications, then, it 
286. See supra notes 264–66 and accompanying text. 
 287. HACKING, supra note 19, at 10, 125. 
288. See id. at 32, 103–05 (distinguishing between indifferent and interactive kinds 
of classifications). 
289. Id. at 103–04. 
290. Id.
291. Id. at 31–32, 102–03. 
292. Id. at 32.  While “[t]he awareness may be personal, [it] more commonly is an 
awareness shared and developed within a group of people, embedded in practices and 
institutions to which they are assigned in virtue of the way in which they are classified.” 
Id. at 104. 
293. Id. at 11. 
294. Id. at 31, 104. 



























[VOL. 49:  161, 2012] Gray Matters 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
“make[s] sense to say that the very individuals and their experiences are
constructed within the matrix surrounding the classification.”296 
Take the example of an individual disabled person.  He may
internalize the stigma directed toward him and believe himself incapable 
of doing certain things.297  He may not apply for a job or go to a grocery 
store because he does not want to burden others.  Or he may react 
differently—he may challenge that stigma.  He may embrace the term
disability.  If he uses a wheelchair, he may chain his wheelchair to a bus
that is not accessible to him and yell, “Access now!”298  In either case, 
the classification disabled affects him.  He has become a disabled person. 
Consider also an individual woman refugee.  Rather than go into 
hiding, the woman responds to questions and submits paperwork to 
government officials who hold her life in the balance.299  She takes her 
children to holiday camps for refugee children.300  She works with an 
immigrant advocacy group that helps usher refugees through the residence
process.301  This matrix of institutions and practices affects her, and the
classification—embedded in that matrix—affects her.302  As she interacts 
with the matrix surrounding the classification woman refugee, she is 
changed by being so classified.  She acquires the characteristics of a
woman refugee.303  “By living that life, she evolves, becomes a certain 
kind of person (a woman refugee).”304 
The same is also true of the child TV viewer.  Reacting to the reported
ills of TV-watching, parents “start to interact, on occasion, with their
children regarded not as their children but as child viewers.”305  Parents
curtail TV-watching and embed parental guidance chips in their TVs.306 
As a result, children may come to see themselves as child viewers and 
296. Id.
297. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and
the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 843 (2003) (discussing 
“psychic harm” imposed by social stigmas). 
298. Cf. TO RIDE THE PUBLIC’S BUSES: THE FIGHT THAT BUILT A MOVEMENT (Mary
Johnson & Barrett Shaw eds., 2001) (chronicling American Disabled for Accessible 
Public Transportation’s use of nonviolent civil disobedience to draw attention to 
inaccessibility of public buses). 
299. See HACKING, supra note 19, at 11. 
300. See id. at 10. 
301. See id.
302. See id. at 10–11. 
303. See id.
304. Id. at 11. 
305. Id. at 27. 
















   
  










may watch less TV or, in defiance, find ways to watch more.307 
Similarly, after receiving counseling from social workers and even new
(foster) parents and homes, children who are abused may come to see 
themselves not as ordinary children but rather as child abuse survivors.308 
And as for child abusers, they are mentally ill, perpetrators of “the worst
possible vice,” and possibly the victims of child abuse themselves.309 
Importantly, this interaction between idea and object is a two-way 
street.  Just as interactive kinds of classifications may cause people to 
change how they feel or behave, changes in people may cause
classifications to be modified or replaced.310  What was known about a
certain classification of people, for instance, “may become false because
people of that kind have changed in virtue of how they have been
classified, what they believe about themselves, or because of how they
have been treated as so classified.  There is a looping effect.”311  As a  
result, classifications of people are not static—they are “on the move.”312 
Disabled may come to mean “activist”; woman refugee may come to
mean “patriot.” 
b. “Indifferent” Kinds: Classifications of Material Things 
Classifications of people are interactive kinds of classifications: they 
interact with the people they classify.  But what about those classifications 
that do not involve interactions with the thing so classified, like
classifications of things in the natural world, such as fundamental 
particles? According to Professor Hacking, these classifications are
“indifferent” kinds of classifications.313  They do not interact with the
thing so classified because the thing is not aware of how it is classified.314 
Take quarks, for example.  “Quarks are not aware that they are quarks
and are not altered simply by being classified as quarks.”315  As a result, 
“[t]he classification ‘quark’ is indifferent in the sense that calling a 
quark a quark makes no difference to the quark.”316  The same can be 
said for plutonium, water, tigers, lemons, and the color yellow.317  And 
307. See id. at 27. 
308. See id. at 162 (explaining that child abuse “has changed the past of many
people, and so changed their very sense of who they are and how they have come to be”). 
309. See id. at 125–26, 135, 137. 
310. Id. at 103. 
311. Id. at 104. 
312. See id. at 108. 
313. See id. at 104–05. 
314. See id. at 32, 105. 
315. Id. at 32. 
316. Id. at 105. 
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because these things are not aware of how they are classified and do not
change accordingly, it makes little sense to say that they are socially
constructed.318 At the very least, these things seem far more inevitable, 
far more determined by the nature of things, than disability, woman
refugee, child TV viewer, or child abuse. 
c. Impairment X: Classifications of People and Material Things 
To summarize, classifications of people, such as woman refugee, 
are interactive kinds of classifications.  These classifications affect people 
who are aware of how they are classified and, in turn, are affected by
how people react to being classified (looping effect).319  In this way,
both the classification (woman refugee) and the thing classified (the 
individual woman) may be said to be socially constructed.320  They change. 
They are contingent.
Classifications of things other than people—things that are not aware 
of and therefore not affected by their classification—are indifferent
kinds of classifications.321  Although the classification plutonium may be 
said to be socially constructed (the idea of plutonium was not inevitable),
the thing so classified (plutonium itself) is not socially constructed.  It is
very much with us, and it is not going anywhere.322 The thing is inevitable. 
Fair enough.  But what happens if a classification is both interactive 
and indifferent—one that refers to both people and, say, the natural 
world?323 Impairment is such a classification.  As seen above, the
classification impairment X (or disorder X, dysfunction X, deficit X, 
defect X, condition X, or what have you) is socially constructed—it exists 
within a matrix of socially contingent institutions and practices that
name and diagnose, educate and entertain, accommodate and legislate.324 
But what about the thing to which impairment X refers? 
On the one hand, the object to which the classification impairment X
refers is some biological pathology that is indifferent, unaffected by its 
318. See id. at 30 (“[Q]uarks, the objects themselves, are not constructs, are not 
social, and are not historical.”); see also id. at 119–20 (distinguishing between indifferent, 
biological kinds and interactive, socially constructed kinds). 
319. See supra notes 291–95, 311–12 and accompanying text. 
320. See HACKING, supra note 19, at 11. 
321. See supra notes 314–19 and accompanying text. 
322. See HACKING, supra note 19, at 105. 
323. See id. at 108. 




















    
     
        









classification.325  You can see it under a microscope.  You can test for it. 
The pathology does not change because researchers have named it or
clinicians have applied it to people.326  Pathologies are not aware of how
they are classified and are therefore not constructed.327 They are inevitable. 
But pathology is not impairment X’s only referent.  The classification 
impairment X also refers to people.328  Now, to head off an obvious  
objection at the outset, one could say that the classification impairment
X refers only to pathology—it does not refer to people who share 
that pathology.  “While people may experience and even embrace
impairment X,” one might say, “the impairment does not refer to them.” 
This seems wrong for two reasons.
First, recall that the vast matrix surrounding the classification 
impairment X includes not only those practices and institutions that name
and diagnose the impairment.329  It also includes those practices and 
institutions that act upon the impairment or, more particularly, on people
classified as having the impairment.330  These practices and institutions 
“change the ways in which individuals experience themselves—and may
even lead people to evolve their feelings and behavior in part because 
they are so classified.”331  As people interact with this matrix of practices 
and institutions, they may also change how impairment X is understood 
(looping effect).332  Therefore, the classification impairment X refers to 
both a pathology and the people whose lives shape, and are shaped by, 
the classification. 
Consider again the example of Asperger’s.  In 2013, Asperger’s will
disappear from the lexicon of the APA and will be replaced by the DSM-V’s
umbrella diagnosis, autism spectrum disorder.333  But Asperger’s will most 
likely not disappear from autobiographies, blogs, and elsewhere.334 
Notwithstanding the lack of coherent diagnostic criteria, the classification 
Asperger’s will probably remain.  Why? Because people currently classified
as having Asperger’s want it to.  For them, it is a shared experience, a way of 
being.335  So there must be more to impairment X than pathology.
325. See HACKING, supra note 19, at 117. 
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. See id. at 119. 
329. See supra notes 285–86 and accompanying text. 
330. See id.
 331. HACKING, supra note 19, at 104. 
332. See supra notes 311–13 and accompanying text. 
333. See DSM-V Proposed Revision, supra note 3.
334. See, e.g., ASPIES FOR FREEDOM, supra note 74. 
335. See, e.g., Dave Angel, Aspergers Diagnosis and the DSM 5 Proposed
Changes, PARENTING ASPERGERS BLOG (Apr. 7, 2010, 12:44 PM), http://parenting
aspergers.com/blog/other/aspergers-diagnosis-and-the-dsm-5-proposed-changes/ (objecting
to DSM-V’s removal of Asperger’s on grounds that, for people with Asperger’s, “the 
214
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Consider also deafness. Although deafness refers to a pathology in
the sense of hearing loss,336 it also refers to an experience, a way of
being in the world.337  Resisting the institutions and practices that
pathologize deafness—for example, school administrators, social workers, 
therapists, surgeons, otologists, hearing aid specialists—the deaf have 
redefined the classification, constituting themselves as a new ethnicity, a 
“linguistic minority” with their own “distinct manual language [ASL],
culture, and social organization.”338 
Second, and more fundamentally, one might argue that impairment X 
presumes at least some connection to the person.  Pathologies, after all, 
do not exist outside of the person—they reside in the person, in their 
blood, in their brains.  But for people, impairment X disappears. 
C.  Autism and Impairment 
Because of the social setting in which impairment X derives its
meaning, impairment X might be said to refer not only to a pathology 
but also to the experience of people classified as having the impairment.339 
In this way, impairment X is constructed in part by those to whom it 
refers.  It is a moving target that changes as people change.340 
The social construction of impairment is important for three reasons. 
First, it means that impairment X is not inevitable, contrary to what both 
disability models say; impairment is in part contingent on the people it 
classifies.341 As people experience and change in response to their
classification, the social institutions and practices surrounding the 
classification impairment X may need to be changed.342 
diagnosis is part of who they are, and changing that to Autism may be extreme and cause
anxiety”). 
336. See THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY, supra note 10, at 429– 
30. 
337. See Lane, supra note 151, at 173 (construing the classification deaf as
“designating a member of a linguistic minority”). 
338. See id. at 174, 179.  “[W]e’re more of an ethnic group because we speak a 
different language. . . .  [D]eafness is a difference, not a deficiency.” Id. at 180. 
339. See supra note 328 and accompanying text; cf. HACKING, supra note 19, at 121 
(stating that one could well maintain that autism “is probably a definite unknown
neuropathology that is the cause of prototypical and most other examples of what we
now call childhood autism” but also includes “autistic children, actual human beings, 
whose way of being is in part constructed”). 
340. See supra notes 311–13, 330–33 and accompanying text. 
341. See supra notes 311–13, 330–33 and accompanying text. 























   





Second, by suggesting that impairment X has to do with peoples’
experiences—how they are conceived of and how they conceive of 
themselves—not just their bodies,343 the social construction of impairment 
raises important moral questions that have policy implications.344  It does
not matter to a pathology if we say we wish it never existed or was less 
pathological.  But people are different.  People are aware of how they 
are classified, either literally or because they interact with the matrix of 
social practices and institutions through which the classification gets 
communicated.345  It matters very much to people when we say that we
wish they were not born or were different than they are. 
Lastly, the social construction of impairment complicates disability,
which, arguably, is itself a social construction.346 Disability refers to
negative treatment based on impairment, and impairment refers both to 
some bedrock biological pathology and to the experience of people so
classified.347  Although both disability and impairment have a social
component, and although these waters are murky, there is a fundamental
distinction between the two that offers some clarity. Disability is 
synonymous with disadvantage, and so the experience of being disabled
is always a negative one.348  Disability is something to be gotten rid 
of.349  Being classified as having an impairment, on the other hand, is not
always a bad thing.  On the contrary, for those so classified, it may be a
good thing.  The classification may be something to be celebrated. 
Autism is a case in point.  The war raging over autism is not a war
about disability.  It is a war between those who believe that autism is a 
(still unidentified) biological pathology and inevitable (“I love my children,
but I do not love autism”) and those who believe that it is an experience 
and therefore contingent (“Autism is a way of being”).350  Both may be
right.351  Autistic people share differences in social communication and 
behavior, and medical research may one day locate the source of those 
differences in a shared pathology.352  But alongside these behavioral
343. See Areheart, supra note 18, at 379 (“[I]mpairment, rightly understood, is
complicated—and is far more than just biology.”). 
344. Cf. Samaha, supra note 18, at 1305 (“If the subordinated status of a group
sharing a physical trait like deformity is the product of irrationally imposed social 
stigma, then one would think the social dynamic needs to be corrected without ‘fixing’ 
the subject of disadvantage.”).
345. See supra notes 292–94 and accompanying text. 
346. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
347. See supra notes 200–02, 326–29 and accompanying text
348. See supra note 191 and accompanying text 
349. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
350. See supra notes 37–38, 40–41 and accompanying text. 
351. See HACKING, supra note 19, at 121. 
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features, autistic people share something else—an experience of being 
different from the norm.
As demonstrated by the neurodiversity movement, autistic people are 
shaped by, and are shaping, autism—resisting, embracing, and transforming
it.353  Under their stewardship, autism has become something that,
although challenging, is also mysteriously beautiful (a window into the 
wonders of the human brain), wildly liberating (not tethered to social 
niceties), and even radically transformative (defying social norms).354 
Through their art, writing, and other modes of communication, the
neurodiverse are challenging the conception of autism as some
undiscovered pathology and pointing instead toward an understanding of 
autism as something akin to homosexuality, blue eyes, tallness, or 
shyness—a characteristic with its own brand of gifts and weaknesses.355 
And if autism turns out to be a biological pathology, then, the
neurodiverse might reasonably argue, it is a pathology in the sense that
hearing loss is a pathology—not necessarily bad, and possibly quite
good.356 
With the Internet as its bricks and mortar, the neurodiversity 
movement has built a vibrant culture that prides itself on pushing the 
bounds of normality.357  Neurodiversity is autism.  Pathology may be too.
As Professor Daniela Caruso notes: 
[A]utism can be credited with a veritable advancement in the understanding of
difference.  Since the spectrum of autistic disorders is ample enough to include 
persons of high accomplishment, the line between the ill other and the healthy 
self is blurred.  The very concept of cognitive impairment dissipates, leaving in
its place a vision of a more advanced society, where human beings are allowed 
to flourish for who they are and are helped to reach their potential without
preconceptions.  The post-modern concept of neuro-diversity, with its promise 
353. See NADESAN, supra note 43, at 204–05. 
354. See supra notes 133–46 and accompanying text. 
355. See Jim Sinclair, Why I Dislike “Person First” Language, CAFEMOM (Sept. 
18, 2007), http://www.cafemom.com/journals/read/436505/ (likening autism to traits such as
blue eyes and left-handedness); cf.  KUTCHINS & KIRK, supra note 16, at 90 & n.66
(calling “homosexuality . . . a normal variant [of sexual behavior]; the nearest analogy is 
that of left-handedness” (quoting Memorandum from Harold Lief, Member of DSM-III-
R Advisory Comm. on Sexual Disorders, to Robert Spitzer, Chair of Work Grp. To 
Revise DSM-III (Jan. 15, 1986))). 
356. See supra notes 337–39 and accompanying text. 









    











      
  
   
of inclusion and its philosophical acceptance of variation, may find in autism a 
perfect home.358  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The oft-claimed binaries surrounding disability and impairment are 
not what they seem.  As autism teaches, there is much gray here.  Two
conclusions emerge. 
First, the medical-versus-social model binary is not as stark as it is
often made out to be.  The two models describe a debate over the cause
of disability: the medical model holds that disability is a deficit in bodily
functioning that inevitably results from impairment, while the social
model holds that disability is negative treatment based on impairment
and is contingent.  Beyond this, disability’s dueling models do not offer 
much. Both models regard disability as a limitation on ability—a
disadvantage—and therefore something to be gotten rid of. Neither model 
requires a particular policy response, and both models acknowledge the
inevitability of impairment. 
The medical-versus-social model binary therefore does not explain the 
autism debate.  Under both models, parents of autistic children and the 
neurodiverse seek the same thing: an end to disability—whether that 
disability is a negative medical state or negative treatment.  Although the
two sides clash over the pursuit of cures and certain treatments for autism,
the medical-versus-social model binary does not explain their conflicting 
policy responses, which depend on moral frameworks independent
of the models.  Lastly, both models agree that impairment is inevitable, 
which turns out to be precisely what parents and the neurodiverse do not
agree about.  The social construction of disability therefore does not 
meaningfully distinguish autism’s sides; the social construction of 
impairment does. 
Second, impairment is not pathology or people’s experience.  It is 
both.  Although impairment refers to pathology, which is inevitable, it 
also refers to those classified as having the impairment, whose experiences 
are contingent.  Impairment is therefore not fixed; it is, in part, constructed.
Again, the autism debate is instructive.  A growing body of medical 
research suggests that autism is a biological pathology—some
unidentified deficit in neurological functioning.  But the neurodiversity
movement shows that autism is also an experience, and a rich one.
Through activism, the Internet, and art, autistic people are adapting to, 
resisting, and transforming the social practices and institutions that
 358. Caruso, supra note 22, at 487 (footnotes omitted) (citing STUART MURRAY, 
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classify them; they are constructing autism.  Although this understanding of
impairment as both pathology and experience does not make peace 
between autism’s sides, it does help to explain how the sides are at odds 
and why they are likely to stay that way.
219
 220
